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April 17, 1981 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 80-1349 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 
v. 
CHRISMAN 
Cert to Wash. S. Ct. 
(Dolliver, Utter, Rozallini, 
Hicks, Williams: Brachtenbach, 
Stafford, Horowitz, dis.) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that the court belovl erroneously 
held that an officer may not enter the premises of a person he 
has arrested. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: · Resps were tried without a 
jury and convicted of possession of more than 40 grams of 
marijuana and a smaller amount of LSD. The CA affirmed the 
.~~~~ n ~-. ,OJ~~J, 
i::t'.. AWi ~ .... ~- 1J.-J c. 
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conviction, but the Washington S. Ct. reversed on the grounds 
t _: that evidence seized was ih violation of the Fourth Amendme nt . . 
The evidence showed that defendant Overdahl was spotted by police 
officer Daugherty walking out of a college dormitory with a half 
gallon of gin. Daugherty stopped Overdahl and requested his 
identification, suspecting that Overdahl was under the age of 21. 
Overdahl said he would have to go upstairs to get his 
identification, but while they were waiting for the elevator, the 
officer asked Overdahl how old he was. Overdahl responded that 
he was 19. Upon arriving at Overdahl's dorm room, Overdahl went 
into the room while the officer stood either in the open doorway 
or just inside the room. The room was occupied by petr and the 
officer observed marijuana seeds and a small pipe lying on the 
desk near him. Concluding that the seeds were marijuana and the 
pipe smelled of marijuana, Daughtery gave the two students their 
Miranda rights and both students signed a waiver consenting to 
the search of their room. A search turned up even more amounts 
of marijuana and LSD. 
The Wash.S.Ct. accetped petr's contention that Daughtery's 
initial warrantless examination of the seeds and the pipe 
amounted to an unconstitutional search and that the evidence 
seized should have been suppressed. It concluded that the plain 
view exception to searches did not apply. The three elements of 
that exception are, (1) prior jus t ification for intrusion, (2) 
inadvertent discovery of incrimina ting evidence, and (3) 
immediate knowledge by the officer that he had evidence before 
him. In this case, there was no j ustification for Daughtery's 
- 3 -
presence in the dorm room. Although Overdahl had been placed 
l 1 under arrest at the time he reached his room, that arrest did not 
• 
,\....._. 
give the officer the right to enter the room to conduct the 
search. There was no evidence that it was necessary for the 
officer to enter the room to seize a weapon which might be used 
in an assault or that the bottle of gin was about to be destroyed 
or that Overdahl was going to attempt an escape. It simply was 
not necessary for the officer to enter the room to make certain 
Overdahl secured his identification. 
Judge Brachtenbach ~s§ented. __ He claims that the majority 
failed to explain why the officer was not entitled to keep the 
arrested person within his sight. It notes that the decision 
below conflicts with other decisions holding that the police 
officer may keep an arrested person within view. See State v. 
Brown, 132 N.J. Super. 180 (1975). Other cases inidcate that if 
a defendant is arrested at his dwelling and asks for access to 
another room, the police may search that room before and a f ter 
granting the request. E.g. United States v. Manson, 523 F.2d 
1122 (DCCA 1975). Still other cases hold that if a defendant is 
arrested in his horne and is allowed to go to another part of it 
the police may accompany the defendant there and seize any 
evidence in plain view. E.g., United States v. DeStephano, 555 
F.2f 1094, 1102 (CA 2 1977). The rationale of these cases -
concern for police safety, avoidi ng possible destruction of 
evidence, and discouraging potential escape attempts - is equally 
persuasive when arrestee outside his dwelling requests to enter 
it. Those cases are indistingui s~able from the situation here. 
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3. CONTENTIONS: Petr partially tracts the reasoning of the 
dissent. The first question presented is whether an individual 
validly under arrest may be accompanied by the arresting officer 
into another area without a warrant. The answer in such cases is 
clearly affirmative, as other cases have held. The second 
question is based on exigent circumstances. Assuming the officer 
was standing outside the premises , his observations of contraband 
in plain view constitute exigent circumstances which permit him 
to enter the premises. See Colorado v. Banister, u.s. 
(1980}, State v. Patterson, - 192 Neb. 308 (1974} (authorizing an 
officer who has reason to believe a crime is being commited 
inside a residence to enter that residence}. 
Resp criticizes petr for taking two conflicting positions, 
the first based on the assumpatio11 that the police officer was in 
the room and the second based on the assumption that he was 
outside the room. 
4. DISCUSSION: I recommend summary reversal essentially 
for the reasons stated by the dissent. If for no other reason 
(A than personal safety, a police officer must surely be permitted 
VJ to keep an arrested person under surveillance at all times. To 
require a police officer to stand outside the home of a person he 
has lawfully arrested puts the officer in an incredibly 
vulnerable position. There is also the danger that the arrestee 
will destroy evidence or make an ~scape attempt. Because the 
officer was justifiably in the room of the arrestee in this case, 
the plain view exception applies. 
There is a response. 
4/1/81 Knauss Op in petn. 
. · 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No.S0-1349 
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N POST DIS AFF REV AFF· G D 
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
. ' 
Mr. Just ice 
White fr~d/ Mr. Justi ce Marsha 
Mr. :ruatice Bla clan 
llr. Ju~tioe Powell 
N.r. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr .. Justioe Stevens 
F.rom:- The Chief Justice 
No. 80-1349, Wa s hington v. Chrisman 
Circulated: MAY 5 1981 
necirculated: ____________ _ 
PER CURIAM . 
A c ampu s p o l ice officer at Washington State 
University o bserved a male youth, Carl Overdahl, exit a 
s tudent dormitory carrying a half - gallon bottle of gin. 
Because washington law forbids possession of alcoholic 
bevera ges by persons under 21, Wash. Rev. Code 
§66.44.270, 1 and Overdahl appeaied to be under ag~, the 
officer stopped him and asked for identification. 
Overdahl r e plied that he would have to return to his 
room to obtain identification. The officer accompanied 
him. 2 
The room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and 
located on the 11th floor of the dormitory. The 
respondent, Overdahl's roommate, was in the room when 
luniversity regulations also forbade possession 
of alcoholic beverages on university property. Tr. 4. 
2while waiting for the elevator, the officer 
asked Overdahl his age. Overdahl responded that he was 
19. The respondent did not argue in the Washington 
courts or in his Brief in Opposition here that this 
admission eliminated the need for Overdahl to produce 
identification a nd thus invalidates the visit to the 
room. 
J ' .. the officer and Overdahl arrived. The officer remained 
in the doorway when Overdahl went ins ide. The 
respondent became visibly nervous at the sight of the 
officer. 
While waiting, the officer observed seeds and a 
small pipe lying on a table in the room. . From his 
training and experience, he believed the seeds were 
marijuana and the pipe was of a type used to smoke 
marijuana. He then entered the room, went over to the 
table, and examined the seeds and the pipe more 
closely. The pipe smelled of marijuana. 
The officer informed both students of their rights 
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426 (1966), and each 
indicated he was willing to waive those rights. The 
officer then asked whether they had any other drugs. 
The respondent handed him three small plastic bags 
containing marijuana. At that point, the officer 
called by radio for assistance. Once a second officer 
had arrived, the students were told a thorough search 
of the room would be necessary. The officers explained 
to the two students that they had an absolute right to 
insist that the officers first obtain a warrant but 
that they could · consent to the search. The officers 
also informed them that any consent would have to be 
voluntary and they could refuse to consent. The 
respondent and Overdahl conferred in whispers, then 
No. 80-1349 , Washington v. Chrisman 
(per curiam) 
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announced that they would consent. The search yielded 
more marijuana and a quantity of lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD). 
An information charged the respondent with one 
count of possessing more than 40 grams of marijuana and 
one of possessing LSD, both felonies under Wash. Rev. 
Code §69 .50 .40l(c) (current version at Wash Rev. Code 
§69.50.40l(d)) .3 A pretrial motion to suppress the 
evidence seized in the room was denied. The respondent 
was convicted after a bench trial. On appeal, the 
Washington Court of Appeals upheld the search and 
affirmed. 24 wash. App. 385, 600 P.2d 1316 (1979). 
The Supreme Court of washington reversed. 94 
wash. 2d 711, 619 P.2d 971 (1980). It held that, 
although the officer properly had placed OVerdahl under 
arrest and followed him to the dormitory room, he had 
no right to enter the room. There was no indication 
that Overdahl might seize a weapon or destroy evidence 
(the gin bottle), and , with the officer blocking the 
only exit from the room, there was no possibility of 
escape. Because no exigent circumstance required the 
officer to enter the room and thus view its interior, 
3overdahl was tried with the respondent for 
possessing marijuana and also was convicted. The 
charges against him were dismissed while the case was 




No. 80-1349, ~shin~~on v. Chrisman 
(per curiam) 
his seizure of the seeds and the pipe did not fall 
within the "plain view" exception to the warrant 
requirement; tha t exception requires some prior 
justification for the officer's being where he sees the 
contraband. In addition , because the respondent and 
Overdahl's consent to the subsequent search of room was 
the fruit of the officer's initial en try, the 
contraband found during that search should have been 
suppressed as well.4 
Three Justices dissented. They believed it was 
fully reasonable for a police officer to keep OVerdahl, 
an arrestee, in sight at all times, including while he 
entered the room. The officer therefore had a 
legitimate reason, in the view of the dissenters, for 
being in the place where he discovered contraband in 
"plain view." 
The "plain view" exception to the warrant 
requirement permits a law enforcement official to seize 
what clearly is evidence or contraband when it is 
discovered in a place where the officer has a 
4Although Art. I, §7 of the Washington . 
Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be 
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, 
without authority of law," the court never cited that 
provision. It did repeatedly refer to the Fourth 
Amendment and cases construing it; therefore it is 
clear the cour t did not rest its decision on an 
independent state ground. 
' ' 
.. . . 
No . 80-1349, ~~shington v. Chrisman 
(per curiam) 
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legitimate right to be. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
u.s. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 
(1968). Here, the Supreme Court of washington 
concluded the officer had lawfully placed Overdahl 
under arrest and therefore was authorized to follow him 
to his room. The Fourth Amendment does not deny a 
police officer who lawfully has taken a per son in to 
custody the authority to keep that individual in sight. 
The absence of an affirmative indication that a 
particular arrestee might reach for a weapon or attempt 
to escape does not vitiate that authority. See 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-110 (1977); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-236 
(1974). The officer did not undertake a complete 
search of the room, including areas completely out of 
reach of the arrestee. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 
u.s. 752, 763 (1969). Rather, with appropriate 
restraint, he remained at the door, entering no farther 
than was necessary to keep the arrested person in view. 
It was only by chance that the officer observed on a 
table what he recognized at once to be contraband. 
This is a classic case of evidence found in plain view 
when a policer officer, for unrelated and entirely 
legitimate reasons, obtains access to someone's private 
area. 
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits seizure 
of evidence of criminal conduct found in these 
; 
No. 80-1349, Washington v. Chrisman 
(per curiam) 
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circumstances. Accordingly, we grant the petition for 
a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Washington, and remand the case for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
· .. . ; 
.. ;- . 
.. . . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
. . ~ 
- l 
-.:§u:pr mu QJ curl c f t1t f 'JI:IttiUlt .§ hrlt g 
Jfag~ ~. C!f. ZO~Jl.;J 
May 6, 1981 
Re: No. 80-1349, Washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Chief, 
I agree with the proposed ~curiam 
you have circulated . 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
... . . 
CHA M BERS O F 
.:§u:pumt ~ourl of flrt %ti±clt .§tatr.S' 
~ftinghm, ~. ~· 20gtJl.~ 
JUSTIC E BYRON R . WHITE 
May 6, 1981 
Re: 80-1349 - Washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Chief, 
I am doubtful that I can join your suggested 
Per Curiam because it extends the plain view 
doctrine beyond its previous bounds. Perhaps 
entry into the room could be justified on another 
ground but I have my doubts about the rationale 
you use. I am considering writing a dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Confe r ence 
cpm 












.:§uprtutt cqo-urt o-f tlyt 'J!Iniitb .$5taftg 
~aslyington. ~· cq. 20~.J!..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
May 6, 1981 
Re: No. 80-1349 Washington v. Chr~srnan 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Kr. Justice Stewart 
Kr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Just1ce Blackmun 
Ur. Just ice Powell 
Mr. Just i ce R~hnqulst 
Mr. Just ~c e Stevens 
Prom: Kr. Justice White 
No. 80-1349 - washington v. Chrisman Circulated: , 7 MAY 1981 
Recirculated:------
I dissent. In this summary dispositio~ the Court 
substantially expands the scope of the plain view doctrine and 
wholly fails to acknowledge that expansion, characterizing this 
as a "classic case" for application of the plain view doctrine. 
Ante, at 
I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer 
had a right to stand in the doorway of respondent's dormitory 
room to keep Overdahl in view and that the officer's observation 
of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. However, the issue in this case is whether, 
having made that observation, the officer was authorized to enter 
the dormitory room without a warrant to examine and seize those 
items.l The C~urt holds that this warrantless entry and seizure 
was justified by the "plain view" doctrine.2 
lThe officer testified at the suppression hearing that the 
only reason he entered the room was to examine the seeds and the 
pipe more closely and to seize them if he determined that they 
were contraband. The pipe was made out of a seashell, so the 
officer needed to examine it to determine whether it was a pipe 
and whether it had been used for smoking marijuana. The seeds 
were on a tray, apart from the pipe. The officer testified that 
when he looked at these seeds from the doorway he thought they 
were marijuana seeds. However, he found it difficult to explain 
how he had been able to distinguish the seeds from other types of 
seeds. Tr., 51. The officer explained that he had enter~d the 
room for just one purpose--"to affirm my beliefs and to seize the 
articles, if they were [contraband]." Tr., p. 44. 
Footnote(s) 2 appear on following page(s). 
..... -2-
Inexplicably, the Court fails to acknowledge the distinction 
between a police officer's observation of an object that is 
inside a dwelling and his entry into the dwelling to seize that 
object. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443, 468 (1971), 
Justice Stewart clearly stated: 
"[P)lain view alone is never enough to justify 
the warrantless search and seizure of evidence. 
This is simply a corollary of the familiar 
principle, discussed above, that no amount of 
probable cause can justify a warrantless search 
or seizure absent 'exigent circumstances.' 
Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an 
incriminating object is on premises belonging to 
a criminal suspect may establish the fullest 
possible measure of probable cause. But even 
where the object is contraband, this Court has 
repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule 
that the police may not enter and make a 
warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United States, 
268 u.s. 1; Johnson v. United States, 333 u.s. 
10, McDonald v. United States, 335 u.s. 451; 
Jones v. United States, 357 u.s. 493, 497-498; 
Chapman v. United States, 365 u.s. 610; Trupiano 
v. United States, 334 u.s. 699." 403 u.s., at 
468.3 
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies only 
after a lawful search is in progress. The "initial intrusion" 
2Although I do not entirely agree with the Supreme Court 
of Washington's analysis in this case, I agree with its 
conclusion that the plain view doctrine alone could not justify 
this warrantless entry and seizure. 
3one of the many cases cited in Coolidge to illustrate 
this point was Taylor v. United States, 268 u.s. 1 (1932). The 
police officers in Taylor had looked through a small opening in a 
garage and had seen cardboard cases inside the garage that they 
believed contained contraband liquor. The officers could smell 
the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet this Court held 
that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the 
garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant. See 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443, 469 n. 25 (1971). 
-3-
must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to the warrant 
requirement. 403 u.s., at 467. 
The Court seeks to justify the officer's warrantless 
intrusion into the dormitory room by relying solely on the plain 
view doctrine. It reasons that since the officer was entitled to 
stand in the doorway to keep Overdahl in vie~he was also 
entitled to enter the room to investigat~ suspicious items that 
were in plain view.4 On this reasoning, any officer passing by 
4The Court relies on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and 
Harris v. United States, 390 u.s. 234 (1968). Neither decision 
supports the majority's analysis in this case. In Harris the 
Court emphasized that the officer had already lawfully entered 
the car when he saw incriminating evidence inside the car and 
seized it: 
"Once the door had been lawfully opened, the 
registration card, with the name of the robbery 
victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long 
been settled that objects falling in the plain 
view of an officer who has a right to be in the 
position to have that view are subject to seizure 
and may be introduced in evidence." 390 u.s., at 




wording of the second 
created some confusion 
One commentator remarked: 
sentence quoted above 
regarding the plain 
"The hardest conceptual problem attending the 
plain view doctrine is to grasp that it is not a 
universal statement of the right of a policeman 
to seize after seeing something in open view1 it 
is rather a limited statement of that right in 
one of its several instances--following a valid 
intrusion. • •• The source of difficulty is that 
the harbinger case, Harris v. United States, 
spoke carelessly in universal terms: 'It has long 
been settled that objects falling in the plain 
view of an officer who has a right to be in the 
position to have that view are subject to seizure . . . . 




the open door of a home who saw incriminating evidence within 
could enter the home and seize the evidence without a warrant.S 
This would severely undercut the protection afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment, for "'the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.'" Payton v. New York, __ u.s. __ , __ (1980), quoting 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 u.s. 297, 313 
(1972). As I read our cases, if an officer who is legitimately 





course, dispose ••• of the problem of crossing 
constitutionally protected thresholds." 
"The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 
Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 
See also 1 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2. 2 (a) 
Whatever confusion was created by this statement in Harris 
should have been dispelled by the clear statement in Coolidge 
. that "plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless 
search and seizure of evidence." 403 u.s., at 468. 
Sin this case it might be argued that the officer's 
observations from the doorway did not even provide probable cause 
to believe that there was contraband in the dormitory room. See 
note 1, supra. However, even if these observations did provide 
probable cause, it is axiomatic that "no amount of probable cause 
can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent 'exigent 
circumstances.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 468. 
In many respects this case is similar to Colorado v. 
Bannister, u.s. (1980), in which we held that an officer's 
observation-of itemS:in plain view within a car did not violate 
the occupant's Fourth Amendment rights. u.s., at n. 4. 
The officer's observations could therefore~e used to establish 
probable cause to search the car. However, it was also necessary 
to justify the warrantless intrusion into the car. We did not 
seek to justify that intrusion by relying on the plain view 
doctrine. Rather, we held that the warrantless entry was 
justified under the so-called "automobile exception" to the 
warrant requirement. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42 
(1970) 1 Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132 (1925). 
-5-
the home, the plain view doctrine alone does not authorize him to 
enter the home without a search warrant to seize those items.6 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
6There is no contention in this case that by entering the 
dormitory building the officer had already entered respondent's 
dwelling. The officer himself testified at trial that a 
dormitory room is considered a "private area" but that the public 
has access to the hallway. Tr., at 37. 
'.tt· 
May 7, 1981 
80-1349 washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with your Per Curiam in this case. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§u:prtl!U' <!Jtturl cf tltt ~nifelt .:§tatt.a' 
~a-9'Jri.ngicn, ~· <!J. 20.?'1-~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 8, 1981 
Re: 80-1349 -Washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Chief: 
After reading Byron's circulation, I am firmly 
convinced that it would be a mistake to dispose of this 
case summarily. I therefore will not be able to join 
your proposed Per Curiam. 
Because we have had our quota of Fourth Amendment 
cases, my first preference is still to deny the 
petition for certiorari. However, rather than have the 
issues decided summarily, I would vote to grant. In 
the event that the case is granted, I would like to 
suggest that the parties be directed to argue two 
separate questions: 
(1) Whether a warrantless entry into a dwelling 
can be justified on the ground that contraband is 
in plain view of an officer outside the dwelling; 
and 
(2) whether the "plain view" doctrine requires 
not only that the object be plainly visible, but 
also that it is plain that the officer has a right 
to search it or to examine it. 
With respect to the latter question, I suppose 
there are at least three possible answers: 
(a) That the article merely be suspicious in 
character, as was the case of the sea shell 
here; 
(b) that there is probable cause to believe 
that it is contraband; or 
,/ . 
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(c) that there is a virtual certainty that 
the item is associated with criminal 
activity. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 











CHAM BERS OF 
~u:prttnt Qfllurl qf tfrc ~b .§ttdt~ 
:W~WirittgLm.l{). <!}. 21l.;tJ!.~ 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR . May 8, 1981 
RE: No. 80-1349 Washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent in the above. 
Sincerely, 
() -J~ I 
// /l I 
l / v -. ,, 
I 
Justice White 





/ v!. ~~·t·:> 
'" 4Fi£~ ~ 
Mr. Justice Powell ~~~-~-­
 Paul Cane 
'--~~~ May 11, 1981 
. /. ..... 
80-1349, washington v. Chr1s~  
This case, as you will recall, ~ ~e o~ 
which the police officer accompanied a student to-~~ d ~ 
dormitory room and stood in the doorway while th~t 
l , .. ~ I 
searched for his I.D. card. Seeds appearing to t 
'( were spotted in the room and the officer seized t~e 
I -..., 
state supreme court held that the search was invalid because 
the officer had no right to stand in the doorway of the 
room. The Conference properly found that this was 
incorrect, and the Chief has written a per curiam. 
As BRW now points out, there is a problem in 
the Chief's draft that no one focused on originally. The 
Chief does not state that exigent circumstances existed to 
justify the entry once the officer (based on his observation 
from the doorway) was confident that drugs were in the room. 
Without a finding of exigent circumstances, as BRW says, the 
officer should have had to get a warrant to enter the room. 
..... ........ ... ~ ""WU,__ ~..... ._. .... l!ciba -
Plainly there were exigent circumstances - -here: the roommate or others could have disposed of the 
drugs if the officer had left the room. But I think BRW is 
correct that this needs to be made explicit in the opinion. 
2. 
Otherwise the "plain view" doctrine would be extended beyond 
its present bounds. 
P.W.C. 05/11/81 
. . 
To: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Kr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justioe lhite 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
llr. 3'Wtt1oe Blaoblun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Kr. Justice RehnQ.uiet 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: The Chi~ Ju.at1oe 
Circulated: ____________ __ 
1st PRI-NTED DRAFT MAY 11 1981 
~~c irculated: ____________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATE OF WASHINGTON v. NEIL MARTIN 
CHRISMAN --::; _.12 t2 ? 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPRl<.JME COUR'.l' AA _ ~( 11J ~ 
OF WASHINGTON ,,_. r 7 
No. 80-1349. Decided May -, 1981 
~ 
PER CuRIAM. • 
A campus police officer at Washington State Universit~.A.n L .I~~ f 
observed a male youth, Carl Overdahl, exit a student dorm~
tory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Because Washing- ~ 
ton law forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by pe ons 
under 21, Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270/ and Overdal 1..._tt 
peared to be under age, the officer stopped him aud asked fP! _ • ~
identification. Overdahl replied that he would have to ~
turn to his room to obtain identification. The officer accom-
panied him.2 
The room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and located on 
the 11th floor of the dormitory. The respondent, Overdahl's 
roommate, was in the room when the officer and Overdahl 
arrived. The officer remained in the doorway when Overdahl 
went inside. The respondent became visibly uervous at the 
sight of the officer. 
While waiting, the officer observed seeds and a small pipe 
lying on a table in the room. From his training and experi-
ence, he believed the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was J of a type used to smoke marihuana. He then went over to 
1 Univen;ity regulations also forbade pos::;e~sion of alcoholic beverages 
on univer:sity property. Tr. 4, :H. 
u While wait.ing for the el«:>vator, tht> officer asked Overdahl his age. 
Overdahl responded t.hat he was 19. The respond«:>nt did not argue in 
the Washington courts or in his Brief in Opposition here that this ad~ 
mission climina.ted the n«:>ed for Overdahl to produce identification and 
thus invalidates the visit to the room. 
.. 
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the table and examined the seeds and the pipe more closely. 
The pipe smelled of marihuana. 
The officer informed both students of their rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966). and each indicat€d 
he was willing to waive those rights. The officer then asked 
whether they had any other drugs. The respondent handed 
him three small plastic bags containing marihuana. At that 
point, the officer called by radio for assistance. Once a sec-
ond officer had arrived, the students were told a thorough 
search of the room would be necessary. The officers ex-
plained to the two students that they had an absolute right 
to insist that the officers first obt-ain a warrant but that they 
could consent to the search. The officers also informed them 
that any consent would have to be voluntary and they could 
refuse to consent. The respondent and Overdahl conferred 
in whispers, then announced that they would consent. The 
search yielded more marihuana and a quantity of lysergic 
acid diethylamide (LSD). 
An information charged the respondent with one count of 
possessing more than 40 grams of marihuana and one of pos-
sessing LSD, both felonies under Wash. Rev. Code§ 69.50.401 
(c) (current version at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d)) .3 
A pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room 
was denied. The respondent was convicted after a bench 
trial. On appeal. the W ashingtou Court of Appeals upheld 
the search and affirmed. 24 Wash. App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316 
(1979). 
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. 94 Wash. 2d 
711 , 619 P . 2d 971 (1980). It held that. although the officer 
properly had placed Overclahl under arrest and followed him 
to the dormitory room, he had no right to enter the room. 
There was no indication that Overdahl might seize a weapon 
or destroy evidence (the gin bottle), and, with the officer 
blocking the only exit from the room, there was no possibility 
a Ov<>rdahl was tri<>d with the r<>spondent for poo;sps::;ing marihuana and 
also was convicted. The charges against him were dismissed while th& 
case was pending before the Supreme Court of Washington . 
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of escape. Because no exigent circumstance required the 
officer to enter the room and thus view its interior, his seizure 
of the seeds and the pipe did not fall within the "plain view" 
exception to the warrant requirement; that exception re-
quires some prior justification for the officer's being where he 
sees the contraband. In addition, because the respondent 
and Overdahl's consent to the subsequent search of room was 
the fruit of the officer's initial entry, the contraband found 
during that search should have been suppressed as well.4 
Three Justices dissented. They believed it was fully rea-
sonable for a police officer to keep Overdahl. an arrestee, in 
sight at all times, including while he entered the room. The 
officer therefore had a legitimate reason, in the view of the 
dissenters, for being in the place where he discovered contra-
band in "plain view." 
The "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement 
permits a law enforcement officials to seize what clearly is 
evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where 
the officer has a legitimate right to be. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 
390 U. S. 234 (1968). Here, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton concluded the officer had lawfully placed Overdahl under 
arrest and therefore was authorized to follow him to his room. 
The Fourth Amendment does not deny a police officer who 
lawfully has taken a person into custody the authority to 
keep that individual ill sight. The absence of an affirmative 
indication that a particular arrestee might reach for a weapon 
or attempt to escape does not vitiate that authority. See 
Pennsylvania v. Mirnms, 434 U. S. 106. 109-110 (1977); 
United States v. Robin,son, 414 U. S. 218, 234- 236 (1974). 
The officer did not undertake a complete search of the roomr 
~Although Art. I, § 7 of t.hc Washington Constitution provides that 
"[n]o person shall be distmbPd in his privatr affairs, or his home in-
vaded , without authority of law." the eourt. never citPd that provision. 
It did repeatedly refer to the Fomth AmendmPnt and cases construing-
it; therefore it is clear the court did not rest its decision on an independ-
ent state ground, 
I 
\ 
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including areas completely out of reach of the arrestee. Cf. 
Chirnel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Rather, with 
appropriate restraint, he remained at the door, entering no 
farther than was necessary to keep the arrested person in 
J view. It was only by chance that the officer, after he had entered the room,5 observed on a table what he recognized at 
once to be contraband. This is a classic case of evidence 
found in plain view when a police officer. for unrelated and 
entirely legitimate reasons, obtains access to someone's private 
area. 
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits seizure of 
evidence of criminal conduct found 1n these circumstances. 
Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, 
vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, 
and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
n The dissrnt misconrrivrs the facts shown by I he record when it ;;tate::; 
the officer entered the room only after he ~aw the marihuana ~eeds and 
the pipe. Post, at -. On the contrary, the oflicrr testifird that he 
wa~ standing in the doorjamb, Tr. 9, 21, 31. 50, and tllf' Supreme Court 
(lf Washington had no trouble concluding that ''[ t]hr police officer was in 
the room at the time he observed the seeds and pipe." 94 Wash. 2d, al 
716; 619 P. 2d, at 974 (empha;;is added). Whatever may be the validity 
of a rule requiring a warrant to enter a dwelling initially when an offieer 
obsPrves rvideuce from thr out~id('-a mattrr not at issue in this ea8<"-
the "initial intrusion" here occurred whru thr officrr followed an arw;tec 
in his cu;;tody into the room, and only after that entry already had taken 
place did he ser the contraband. 
We also note that the trial judge fouud the re;;pondent's nre:senee in the 
room and hb suspicion~ behavior indiratrd that. '·if [the ofliepr] departed 
with the intention of obtaining a ~earch wanant, that thP contraband 
would rapidly disapprar. Thi~ clearly con~titute~ exigent ~cumstan('e:;" 
eliminating any nPed there otherwi;;e might havr be~1o"t1'6tai'ii a ;:;rant. 
Record 20. Of rour~e, thi~ finding becamr irrPlevant once the Supreme 
Court of Wa:;hiugton lwld th·tt thr offirer could nut Pven look mto the· 
room. 
'J.'o: The en let· Just1oe 
Mr. Just 'leG Brennan 
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Mr. Just • ''.:l M~rshall 
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JusTICE WHI'l'E, dissenting. 
I dissent. In this summary disposition, the Court sub-
stantially expands the scope of the plaiu view doctrine and 
wholly fails to acknowledge that expansion, characterizing 
this as a "classic case" for application of the plain view doc-
trine. Ante, at -. 
I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer 
had a right to stand in the doorway of respondent's dormi-
tory room to keep Overdahl in viev; ami that the officer's 
observation of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point 
did not violate the Fourth Ameudment. However, the issue 
in this case is whether, having made that observation, the 
officer was authorized to enter the dormitory room without a 
warrant to examine and seize those items.1 The Court holds 
that this warrantless entry and seizure was justified by the 
''plain view" cloctrine.2 
1 The officer te::;tified at the ~llllJlrP;;~;ion bearing that the on]~ · rea~Son 
·he entered the room was to examine the seed;; and the pipe more closely 
and to ~Pize them if he determined that they werr contraband. Thr pipe 
wa::; made out of a ~ea<;hell, ~o t hr officrr nreded to examine it to drtermine 
whether it wa::; a pipe and whet her it had been u~rd for smoking mari~ 
!mana. The serd~ Wl·r·e 011 a tray, apart from the pipe. The officer 
tecitified that whrn hr looked at thr~e ~rrd~ from the doorway he thought 
t!H'Y were marihuana ~eed~. Howewr, hl' found it diffiC'ult to explain 
how he had bren abll' to di::;tingui~h the :;reds from other type~ of ::;eecl::;. 
Tr., 51. The officer explained that hP had t•ntNed the room for jn~t one 
purpo::;e-"to aii-irm m~· belief::; and to seize the article::;, if they were 
'[contraband]." Tr., p. 44. 
2 Although I do not entirely agree with the Supreme Court of Wa::;h-
11 MAY 1981 
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Inexplicably, the Court fails to acknowledge the distinctiorl 
between a police officer's observation of an object that is in-
side a dwelling and his entry into the dwelling to seize thati 
object. In Coolidge v. l\'ew Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), 
JusTICE RTEWART clearly stated: 
"[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the war-
rantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary 
of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount 
of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or' 
seizure absent 'exigent circumstances.' Incontrovertible 
testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is 
011 premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish 
the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even 
where the object is contraband. this Court has repeatedly 
stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may Hot 
enter and make a warrantless seizure. Taylor Y. United 
States, 286 U. S. 1; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 
10; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Jones v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 493. 497-498; Chapman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 610; Trupiano v. United States, 
334 U. S. 699." 403 U. S., at 468.3 
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies 
only after a lawful search is in progress. The "initial intru-
sion" must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to 
the warrant requireme11t. 403 U. S .. at 467. 
The Court seeks to justify the officer's warrantless intru~ 
ingtou'::: anab·si::> in thi:; cu~e, I agree with it~ ronclusion tl111t thr plain 
view dortrine alone could not justify thi::l warrantlr:<s entry and ~Pizure. 
8 One of the many ca;;es c·ited iu Coolidge to illustratf' thi~ point wa~ 
'l'aylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (19:~2). Tlw polirr officer,.; in 1'aylur 
had looked through a small opening in a gurngt' and had srPn cardboard 
case~ inf'idr the garagr that thPy brlievrd contained rontrnband liquor. 
The officpr~ rould snwll the odor of whiskPy rom in~~: from the guragt•. Yet 
thi~ Court held thnt they had violatrd thr Fomth Am('!Jclment I>~· Pntt>ring · 
the garage and :;eizing tllP whi~kP~' without obtaining a warrant. See· 
Coolidye Y; New Ilampshii·e, .4o:vu. 8 .. 443, 469, 11 .. 25 (19il) .. 
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:sion into the dormitory room by relying solely on the plain 
view doctrine. It reasons that since the officer wa.s entitled 
to stand iu the doorway to keep Overdahl in view. he was 
also entitled to enter the room to investigate suspicious items 
that wPre in plain view.4 On this reasoning, any officer pass-
4 The Court relies on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, a11d Harri.s v. 
United States. 390 U. S. 234 (196~). Neither deci:sion support:; the 
Court's analysis in this case. Harris involved an automobile that had 
been impounded and towed to a police station. The window:; of the car 
were open, the doors were unlocked, and it had begun to rain. The Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police officer to 
obtain a warrant before opening the door of the car to roll up the car 
window, for thi:s was :simply "a mea:;ure taken to protect the car while it 
was in police custody." 390 U. S., at 236. Harris did not rely on the 
plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless intrusion into the automobile. 
The Court emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully entered 
the· cal' when he sa.w incriminating evidence in plain view in:side tlw car 
and seized it: 
"Once the door lutd lawfull:I.J beeu opened. the regi:;tration cnrd, with 
the name of the robber~' victim on it, wa:; plainly vi:sible. It has long 
been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has 
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to :seizure and 
may be introduced in evidence." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
The broad wording of the second sentence quoted above has apparently 
created some confusion regnrding the plain view doctrine. One com-
mentator remarked: 
"The hardest conceptual problrm nttending thr J>lain view doctrine. is 
to grasp that it is not a uuiver:sal statement of the right of a policeman 
to seize after seeing something in open view; it is rather a limited state-
ment of that right in one of its severul instance:s-following a valid in-
trusion . . . . The source of difficult.v i~ thnt the harbinger case, Ha·rris v. 
United States, spoke care]p,;sly in Hniver:;al term~: 'It ha,; long br('fl settled 
that objects falling in the plain view of an otneer who has a right to be 
in the position to have that view are subject to ~t>izurc ... .' 
"SPeing something in opeu view does not, of cour~e. di:;pose ... of the 
problem of cro~:;ing eonstitutionally protected thrrsholds." 
Moylan, "The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 'Search 
Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rt•v. 1047, 1096 (1975). See 
nlso 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2 (a) (197~). Thi~ problem of 
"crossing eon~titutionall~' protected thre:sholds" witho11t H warrant i:; ea:sily 
resolved if the so-called "automobile excrption" to the warrant rP<JUire-
mcnt applies, for that exception ju:;tifies the officer's warrautle::;:; ~ntry 
4 WASHINGTON v. CHRISMAN 
ing by the open door of a home who saw incriminating evi-
dence within could enter the home alld seize the evidence 
without a warrant.u This would severely undercut the pro-
tection afforded by the Fourth Amendment, for "the 'phys-
ical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" Payton v. 
New York, 445 U. S. 573. 585-586 (1980), quoting United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 
(1972). As I read our cases, if an officer who is legitimately 
standing in the doorway of a home sees incriminating items 
inside the home, the pla.in view doctrine alone does not au-
thorize him to eHter the home without a search warrant to 
seize those items.6 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
into the automobile to st'ize contraband in plain view inside th<' car. 
S<'e 11. 5, iufra. 
sIn this caRe it might be nrgued that the offiecr'i:i observations from the 
doorway did 110t even provide· probnble cause to believe that ther(' was 
contrabund in the dormitory room. See n. 1, supra. HoweYer, Pven if 
these observations did providE' probuble cau::;e, it is axiomatic thut "no 
amount of probable cause cun jwstify u warnmtle8s search or seizure 
ab~ent 'E'xigPnt circumstances.'" Coolidge v. New Ham]Jshire, supra, at 
468. 
Iu many respects thi~ cuse is similnr to Colorado v. Banlti13tPr. -
U. S. - ( 1980), in which we held that un officE'r's observutiou of items 
in pia in view within a ear did not violate the oceupant'10 Fourth Amend-
ment rights. - U. S., at -, n. 4. Tlw officer's ob~erwttions eould 
therefore be usE'd to establi~h probable cau:se to 10earrh thE' car. However, 
it was also neres~ary to justify the wa rrantle~s int ru,;ion into the rar. We 
did not seek to ju;otify that intru~ion by relying on the plaiu view doetrine. 
Rather, we held that the warrantle,;~ entr~· was ju~tified under the S"l-
ralled "automobilt' exception" to the warrant requirement. See Chambers-
v. Mamney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. Uuited Stat~s, 267 U.S. 132 
( 1925). 
8 There is no <'Oitlention iu thi~ case that b~· pntering thr dormitory 
building the officer had alrPad~· entE'red re~pondent'~ dwelling. The officer· 
himself testified at tri::tl that a dormitor~· room is couHiclered a "private· 
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I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer 
had a right to stand in the doorway of respondent's dormitory 
room to keep Overdahl in view and that the officer's observation 
of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. Yet I do not agree that the officer entered 
the room by standing in the doorway. The officer's subsequent 
warrantless entry into the room to seize the seeds and pipe 
cannot be justified by relying solely on the plain view doctrine. 
Therefore, I would vacate the judgment and remand the case to 
enable the Supreme Court of Washington to determine whether 
exigent circumstances justified this warrantless entry and 
whether the office r had probable cause to believe that the items 
he saw inside the room were contraband. 
The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had 
not physically entered the room while he was observing Overdahl, 
and that he had subsequently entered the room solely to confirm 
his suspicion that the seeds and the seashell he had observed 
from the doorway were marihuana seeds and a seashell pipe that 
had been used to smoke marihuana. The officer's uncontradicted 
testimony establishes that he remained in the doorway until he 
entered the room to examine the seeds and pipe.l The Court 
Footnote(s) 1 appear on following page(s). 
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apparently has determined as a matter of law that any police 
officer who stands in the open doorway of a home has "entered" 
the home. I disagree, for under the Court's analysis a police 
officer may intrude into a home without a warrant to seize any 
incriminating evidence or contraband that he is able to see while 
standing in the doorway. 
The plain view doctrine clearly does not authorize an 
officer to enter a dwelling without a warrant to seize contraband 
merely because the contraband was visible from outside the 
dwelling. As Justice Stewart stated in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971): 
"[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify 
lThe officer testified: 
"I stood in the doorway without entering, 
actually physically entering the room .••. I was 
standing against the doorjamb. • •• I was not in 
the room. I was in the doorway." Tr. 7, 9, 21. 
The trial court stated in its memorandum opinon that "the 
officer stood in the doorway, and watched [Overdahl] ," observed 
the seashell pipe and the seeds from the doorway, and "then 
entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds closely." 
Record 18 (emphasis added). Similarly, the court of appeals 
stated: "Prior to entering the room, the officer saw from his 
vantage point in the doorway what he believed to be contraband. 
Only at that time, did he cross the threshold and seize the pipe 
and marlJUana seeds." App. to Pet. for Cert. 27 (emphasis 
added) • 
As I read the Supreme Court of Washington's op1n1on, the 
court held that whether or not the officer had physically entered 
the room by standing in the doorway, his presence in the doorway 
was sufficiently intrusive that his observations were unlawful 
unless he could justify his presence. The court concluded that 
the officer should have remained outside the room, since there 
was no indication that Overdahl was likely to escape, destroy 
evidence, or seize a weapon. 
-3-
the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is 
simply a corollary of the familiar principle 
discussed above, that no amount of probable cause 
can justify a warrantless search or seizure 
absent 'exigent circumstances.' Incontrovertible 
testimony of the senses that an incriminating 
object is on premises belonging to a criminal 
suspect may establish the fullest possible 
measure of probable cause. But even where the 
object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly 
stated and enforced the basic rule that the 
police may not enter and make a warrantless 
seizure. Taylor v. United States, 286 u.s. 1: 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, McDonald 
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451: Jones v. United 
States, 357 u.s. 493, 497-498: Chapman v. United 
States, 365 u.s. 610: Trupiano v. United States, 
334 u.s. 699." 403 u.s., at 468.2 
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies only 
after a lawful search is in progress. The "initial intrusion" 
must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to the warrant 
requirement. 403 u.s., at 467. 
If a police officer passing by the open door of a home sees 
incriminating evidence within the home, his observations may 
provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Yet 
the officer may not enter the home without a warrant unless an 
exception to the warrant requirement applies.3 This rule is 
2one of the many cases cited in Coolidge to illustrate 
this point was Taylor v. United States, 286 u.s. 1 (1932). The 
police officers in Taylor had looked through a small opening in a 
garage and had seen cardboard cases inside the garage that they 
believed contained contraband liquor. The officers could smell 
the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet this Court held 
that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the 
garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant. 
3There is no contention in this case that by entering the 
dormitory building the officer had already entered respondent's 
dwelling. The officer himself testified at trial that a 
dormitory room is considered a "private area" but that the public 
-4-
fully supported by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and Harris 
v. United States, 390 u.s. 234 (1968) .4 Any contrary rule would 
has access to the hallway. Tr. 37. 
4Harris v. United States involved an automobile that had 
been impounded and towed to a police station. The windows of the 
car were open, the doors were unlocked, and it had begun to rain. 
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the 
police officer to obtain a warrant before opening the door of the 
car to roll up the car window, for this was simply "a measure 
taken to protect the car while it was in police custody." 390 
u.s., at 236. Harris did not rely on the plain view doctrine to 
justify the warrantless intrusion into the automobile. The Court 
emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully entered 
the car when he saw incriminating evidence in plain view inside 
the car and seized it: 
"Once the door had lawfully been opened, the 
registration card, with the name of the robbery 
victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long 
been settled that objects falling in the plain 
view of an officer who has a right to be in the 
position to have that view are subject to seizure 
and may be introduced in evidence." Ibid. 




wording of the second 
created some confusion 
One commentator remarked: 
sentence quoted above 
regarding the plain 
"The hardest conceptual problem attending the 
plain view doctrine is to grasp that it is not a 
universal statement of the right of a policeman 
to seize after seeing something in open view; it 
is rather a limited statement of that right in 
one of its several instances--following a valid 
intrusion ••.• The source of difficulty is that 
the harbinger case, Harris v. United States, 
spoke carelessly in universal terms: 'It has long 
been settled that objects falling in the plain 
view of an officer who has a right to be in the 
position to have that view are subject to seizure 
I 
"Seeing something in open view does not, of 
course, dispose • • • of the problem of crossing 




severely undercut the protection afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment, for "the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-586 {1980), quoting United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 u.s. 297, 313 {1972). 
I do not read the Court's opinion as conflicting with this 
general analysis.5 The Court simply contends that here the 
officer had already lawfully entered the room to observe 





"The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 
Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 
See also 1 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 2.2{a) 
This problem of "crossing constitutionally protected 
thresholds" without a warrant is easily resolved if the so-called 
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement applies, for 
that exception justifies a warrantless entry into the automobile 
to seize contraband in plain view inside the car. In Colorado v. 
Bannister, u.s. {1980), for example, we held that an 
officer's observation of items in plain view inside a car did not 
violate the occupant's Fourth Amendment rights. u.s., at 
n. 4. The officer's observations could therefore be used to 
establish probable cause to search the car. Yet it was also 
necessary to justify the warrantless intrusion into the car. We 
did not seek to justify that intrusion by relying on the plain 
view doctrine. Rather, we held that the warrantless entry was 
justified under the "automobile exception" to the warrant 
requirement. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42 {1970); 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 {1925). 
5In fact, the Court explains that "[t]he 'plain view' 
exception to the warrant requirement permits a law enforcement 
official to seize what clearly is evidence or contraband when it 
is discovered in a place where the officer has a legitimate right 
to be." Ante, at {emphasis added) • Thus, the plain view 
doctrine justifies a-warrantless seizure of contraband only if 
the officer lawfully enters the premises where the contraband is 
located. 
-6-
differently if the officer had seen these items through an open 
window or if the officer had been standing in the hallway rather 
than the doorway. 
As the Court observes, ante, at , n. 5, an exception to 
the warrant requirement may apply here. The trial court found 
that exigent circumstances justified the officer's warrantless 
entry into the room to seize the seeds and the pipe. The Supreme 
Court of Washington did not review this finding.6 Nor did it 
consider whether the officer's observations from the doorway 
provided him with probable cause to believe that the items he had 
observed were contraband. 
Although the Court asserts that the officer observed items 
that "he recognized at once to be contraband," ante, at , the 
record suggests that the officer merely suspected that the items 
he saw were contraband. The officer saw a seashell and some 
seeds on a tray inside the room. He suspected that the seashell 
had been used as a marihuana pipe, since he had seen seashell 
pipes before and one end of this seashell was black. He thought 
6The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that it was 
unnecessary for the officer to intrude into the room to observe 
Overdahl. However, it did not consider whether there were 
exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless entry to seize 
the seeds and the pipe. 
The court of appeals concluded: "[E]xigent circumstances 
existed here. Because the drugs could have been readily disposed 
of while the police officer was trying to obtain a search 
warrant, sufficient exigent circumstances existed to justify the 
[warrantless] seizure." App. to Pet. for Cert. 29. The court of 
appeals recognized that the "preintrusion 'open view' observation 
from the doorway of Overdahl's room" did not justify the 
warrantless entry into the room. Ibid. 
-7-
the seeds looked like marihuana seeds. Yet he found it difficult 
to explain how he had been able to distinguish these seeds from 
other types of seeds, particularly from a distance. Tr. 16-17, 
51-53. The officer testified that he entered the room to inspect 
the seeds and the seashell and to seize these articles if they 
were contraband.? Only after he had examined the seeds more 
closely, picked up the pipe, smelled the contents of the pipe, 
and concluded that the pipe had been used to smoke marijuana, did 
the officer advise Overdahl and respondent of their rights.8 
Because I agree that the Supreme Court of washington erred 
in holding that the officer was not entitled to stand in the 
7The officer did not suggest that he had entered the room 
to keep a closer watch on Overdahl. Rather, he stated that the 
only reason he had entered the room was to examine the seeds and 
the pipe more closely and to seize them if he determined that 
they were contraband: 
A: "I went, entered in to affirm my beliefs and 
to seize the articles if they were [contraband]." 
Q: "So, you went in to inspect the seeds and the 
pipe, for further inspections and for no other 
purpose? ••• There was no other purpose?" 
A: "No, sir." Tr. 44. 
8The officer testified: 
"I then entered the room, walked directly to the 
seeds, I looked at them. I walked past them. I 
walked over to the desk and picked up the pipe, 
smelled the contents of the pipe, which was 
similar to that of marijuana that I had been in 
contact with in the past. I then turned and 
stated to the individuals that before we 
proceeded any farther I must advise them of their 
rights." Tr. 19-20. 
-a-
doorway to keep Overdahl in view, I would vacate the judgment and 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
. '• . " 
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JusTICf WHITE, concurring in the result. 
I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer 
had a right to stl}nd in the doorway of respondent's dormi-
tory room to keep Overdahl in view and that the officer's 
observatipn of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Yet I do not agree 
that the officer entered the room by standing in the doorway. 
The officer's subs(;lquent warrantless entry into the room to 
seize the seeds and pipe cannot be justified by relying solely 
on the plain view doctrine. Therefore, I would · vacate the 
judgment and remand the case to enable the Supreme Court 
of Washington to determine whether exigent circumstances 
justified this warrantless entry and whether the officer had 
probable cause to believe that the items he saw inside the 
room were contraband. 
The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had 
not physically entered the room while he was observing Over-
dahl, and that he had subsequently entered the room solely 
to confirm his suspicion that the seeds and the seashell he 
had observed from the doorway were marihuana seeds and 
a seashell pipe that had been used to smoke marihuana. 
The officer's uncontradicted testimony establishes that he re-
mained' in the doorway until he entered the room to examine 
the seeds and pipe.1 The Court apparently has determined 
t The officer testified: 
"I stood in the doorway without entering, actually physically entering the 
2 WA5HUWTON v. ~HRISMAN 
as a matter of law that any police officer who stauds in the 
open doorway of a home has "eu tered" the home. I dis~ 
agree, for under the Court's analysis a police officer may in-
trude into a home without a warrant to seize any incrimiuat-
ing evidence or contraband that he is able to see while 
standing in the doorway. 
The plain view doctrine clearly does not authorize an offi-
cer to enter a dwelling without a warrant to seize contrabaud 
merely because the contraband was visible from outside the 
dwelling. As JusTICE STEWART stated in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971): 
"[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the war~ 
rantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary 
of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount 
of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or 
seizure absent 'exigent circumstances.' Incontrovertible 
testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is 
on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish 
the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even 
where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly 
stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not 
enter and make a warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United 
room. . . . I was standing against the doorjamb. . . . I was not in 
the room. I was in the doorway." Tr. 7, 9, 21. 
The trial court stated in it~:; memorandum opinion that "the offict>r 
stood in the doorway, and watched [Overdahl]," observed the sea:;hell 
pipe and the seeds from the doorway, and "then entered the room and 
tlxamined the pipe nnd r;eeds cloi:iely." Record 18 (empha10is added). 
Similnrly, the court of nppenl:; stated: "Prior to entering the room, the 
officer saw from his vantage point in the doorway what he believed to be 
contraband. Only at that time, did he <Toss the threshold and ;;eize the 
pipe and marijuana seeds." App. to Pet. for Cert. 27 (emphasiti udded). 
As I read the Supreme Court of Washington 's opinion, the court held 
that whether or not the officer had 11hysically entered the room by stand-
ing in the doorway, his presence in the doorway was sufficiently intru~:;ive 
that hi~ observntions were unlawful unleHl:l he co11ld justify his presence. 
The court concluded that tlw ofiieer :;hould have remained outt>ide the 
room, since there was no indication that Overdahl was likely to escape, 
destroy evidence, or seize a weapon. 
WASHfN6'f0N v, €HRISMAN 
States, 286 U. S. 1; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 
10; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451; Jones v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 493, 497-498; Chapman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 610; Trupiano v. United States, 
403 U. S., at 468.2 
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies 
only after a lawful search is in progress. The "initial intru-
sion" must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to 
the warrant requirement. 403 U. S., at 467. 
If a police officer passing by the open door of a home sees 
incriminating evidence within the home, his observation may 
provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 
Yet the officer may not enter the horne without a warrant 
unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.3 
'rhis rule is fully supported by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
s~tpra, and Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968).4 
2 One of the many cases cited in Coolidge to illustrate this point was 
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932). The police officers in Taylor 
had looked through a small opening in a garage and had seen cardboard 
cases inside the garage that they believed contained contraband liquor. 
The officers could sinell the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet 
this Court held that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering 
the garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant. 
8 There is no contention in this case that by entering the dormitory 
building the officer had alfeady entered respondent's dwelling. The officer 
him~;clf t.estified at trial that a dormitory room is considered a "private 
area" but that the public has t~ccess to the hallway. Tr. 37. 
4 Harris v. United States involved an t~utomobile that had been im-
pounded and towed to a police sta tion . The windows of the car were 
open, the doors were unlocked, and it had begun to rain . The Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police officer to 
obtnin a warrant before opening the door of the car to roll up the car 
window, for this was simply "n measure taken to protect the rar whil<· 
it was in police custody." 390 U. S., at 236. Harl'i,s did not rely on the 
plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless intru~;ion into the automobile. 
The Court emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully enterf'd 
the car when he saw im·riminating f'vidence in plain view insidE' the car 
and seized it: 
"Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with 
the natne of the robbery viptim on it, was plainly visible. It has lont 
4 wMlHINOTON v. cHnl~MAN 
Any contrary rule would severely undercut the protection 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment, for "the 'physical entry 
of the home is the chief evil against which the wordiBg of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573, 585-586 (1980), quoting United States v. 
United States District Court 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). 
I do not read the Court's opinion as conflicting with this 
genpral analysis.5 The Court simply contends that here the 
been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has 
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and 
may be introduced in evidence." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
The broad wording of the second sentence quoted above has apparently 
created some confusion regarding the plain view ·doctrine. One com-
mentator remarked: 
"The hardest conceptual problem attending the plain view doctrine is 
to grasp that it is not a universal statement of the right of a policeman 
to seize after seeing something in open view; it is rather a limited state-
mt-nt of that right in one of its several instances-following a valid in-
trusion. . . . The source of difficulty is that the harbinger case, Harris v. 
United States, spoke carelessly in universal terms: 'It has long been settled 
that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be 
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure ... .' 
"Seeing something in open view does not, 'Of course, dispose ... of the 
problem of crossing constitutionally protected thresholds." 
Moylan, "The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 'Search 
Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 (1975). See 
also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2 (a) (1978). 
Thi~> problem of "cros~>ing constitutionally protPctt-d thrt-sholds" without 
a warrant is easily resolved if the so-culled "automobile exception" to 
the warrant requirernt>nt appliP~, for that exception justifit>~> a warranties~> 
entry into the automobile to seize contraLand in plain view in:;ide the car. 
In Colorado v. Bamzister, - U. S. - (1900), for example, we held 
that an officer's observation of items in plain view inside a car did not 
violate the occupant'~ Fourth Amendment rights . - U. S., at -, n. 4. 
The officer's observations could therefore be u:;ed to e:;tabli~>h probable 
cau~>e to search the car. Yet it wa~> al::;o nece&:;ary to justify the war-
rantless intrusion into the car. We did not ~eek to ju~tify that intrusion 
by relying on the plain view doctrine. HHther, we held that the warrant-
)e&:; entry was ju:;tified under the "automobile exct>ption" to the warrant 
requirement. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. 
Uuited States , 267 U. S. 132 (1925). 
6 In fact, t!Je Court exJ)iaiu~> thaL "[t]he 'plain view' exception to the· 
• 
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officer had already lawfully entered the room to observe Over-
dahl. Apparently the Court would approach this case quite 
differently if the officer had seen these items through an 
open window or if the officer had been standing in the hall-
way rather than the doorway. 
As the Court observes, ante, at - , n. 5, an exception to 
the warrant requirement may a.pply here. The trial court 
found that exigent circumstances justified the officer's war-
rantless entry into the room to seize the seeds and the pipe. 
The Supreme Court of Washington did not review this find-
ing.6 Nor did it consider whether the officer's c:bservations 
from the doorway provided him with probable cause to be-
lieve that the items he had observed were con trabaud. 
Although the Court asserts that the officer observed items 
that "he recognized at once to be contrabaud" ante, at-, the 
record suggests that the officer merely suspected that the 
items he saw were contraband. The officer saw a seashell and 
some seeds on a tray inside the room. He suspected that the 
seashell had been used as a marihuana pipe since he had seen 
seashell pipes before and one end of this seashell was black. 
He thought the seeds looked like marihuana seeds. Yet h~ 
.Jou11d it difficult to explain how he had been able to distin-
warrant requirement permits a law enforcement official to seize what 
clearly i;; evidence or constraband when it is discovered iu a place where 
the officer has a leyitirnate right to be." Ante, at - (emphasis added). 
Thus, the plain view doctrine justifies a warrantless !:ieizure or contraband 
only if the officer lawfully enters the premi~:;es where the contraband is 
located. 
6 The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that it was unneces:>ary 
for the officer to intrude into the room to observe Overdahl. However, 
it did uot con:;ider whether there were exigent circumstances that justifiecl 
a warrantle;s entry to seize the :;eed:; and the pipe. 
The court or appeals concluded: "[E] xigent circumstances existed here. 
l3ecause the drugs could have been readily disposed of while the police 
officer was trying to obtain a search warrant, sufficient exigent circum-
stances existed to justify the [warrantless] seizure." App. to Pet. fof' 
Cert. 29. The court of appeals recognized that the "preintrusion 'open 
view' observation from the doorway of Overdahl's room" did not ju;;tify-
.th~ wartantle~>S entry intQ th~ roQI}l, Ibid , 
6 WASHINGTON v. CHRISMAN 
guish these seeds from other types of seeds, particularly from 
a dista11ce. Tr. 16-17, 51-53. The officer testified that he 
entered the room to inspect the seeds and the seashell and to 
seize these articles if they were contraband.7 Only after he 
had examined the seeds more closely, picked up the pipe, 
smelled the contents of the pipe, and concluded that the pipe 
had been used to smoke marihuana, did the officer advise 
Overdahl and respondent of their rights.8 
Because I agree that the Supreme Court of Washington 
erred in holding that the officer was not entitled to stand in 
the doorway to keep Overdahl in view, I would vacate the 
judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsist-
ent with this o:pipiop, 
7 The officer did not suggest that he had entered the room to keep a 
closer watch on Overdahl. Rather, he stated that the only reason he 
had entered the room was to examine the seeds and the pipe more clol:!ely 
and to seize them if he determined that they were contraband: 
A: "I went, entered in to affirm my beliefs and to seize the articles if 
they were [contraband]. ... " 
Q: "So, you went in to inspect the seeds and the pipe, for further in-
spection~ and for no other purpose? . . • There was no other purpose?" 
A: "No, l:iir." Tr. 44. 
s The officer testified: 
"I then entered the room, walked directly to the seeds, I looked at them, 
I walked past them. I walked over to the desk and picked up the pipe, 
11melled the contents of the pipe, which was similar to that of marijuana 
that I had been in contact with in the past. I then turned and stated 
to the individuals that before we proceeded any farther I must advise 
them of their rights." Tr. 19-20. 
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June 10, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 80-1349, ~ashinqton v. Chrisman 
In the interest of getting this case moving , I am 
proposing a modification. Byron has raised an 
i 
interesting issue regarding the scope of the "plain 
view" doctrine--i.e., whether a police officer may enter 
a dwelling without a warrant when he sees contraband 
from the outside . I believe we should address this 
problem at some point, but this is probably not the case 
in which to do so . First, this is a dormitory room; we 
would be better off reaching this issue for the first 
time in the context of a private home. Second, the 
Washington Supreme Court expressly held that the officer 
was already inside the room when he first observed the 
contraband ; thus, the issue is not squarely presented. 
Third, since Overdahl was under arrest, the officer 
could have followed him into the room in any event to 
maintain the arrest custody. 
Although I continue to believe going over to the 
table would . have been permissible even if the officer 
had first noticed the marijuana wh ile standing 
completely outside the dormitory room--and although four 
have joined on this point--! am prepared to yield to 
avoid granting this case. My primary concern from the 
start--with which no one seems to have disagreed--has 
been the Washington Supreme Court's holding that a 
police officer may not keep a lawfully arrested person 
in sight absent some affirmative indication that his 
safety is endangered, that evidence might be destroyed, 
or that the arrestee might escape. I therefore am 
willing to modify my per curiam to hold only that the 
officer's observation of the pipe and seeds was 
permissible. The opinion would then vacate and remand, 
leaving the respondent free to raise Byron's point--or 
the other elements of "plain view"--on remand. 
I attach a 
paragraphs that 
typed revidion of the final two 
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PER CuRIAM. 
A c:>m pus police officer at vVashington State tTniversity 
observed a male youth, Carl Overdahl. exit a student uormi-
tory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Because Washing-
ton law forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by persons 
under 21, Wash. Rev. Code § 66.4.4.270,1 and Overda.hl ap-
peared to be under age, the officer stopped him and asked for 
jdentification. Overdahl replied that he would have to re-
turn to his room to obtain identification. The officer accom-
panied him.% 
The room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and located on 
the 11th floor of the dormit<;>ry. The respondent. Overdahl's 
roommate, was in the roon1 when the officer and OverdaJ1l 
arrived. The officer remained in the doorway when Overdahl 
went inside. The respondent became visibly nervous at the 
sight of the officer. 
Vi7hile waiting. the officer observed seeds and a small pipe 
lying on a table in the room. From his training and experi-
ence, he believed the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was 
of a type used to smoke marihuana. He thell "·ent over to 
1 University regubt.ion~ also forb:Hle possPssion of alcoholic bcwrages 
on uniYersity propcr1~·. Tr. 4, :34. 
2 While waiting for the rh-Yator, the officer a~kC'd o,·erdahl his age. 
o,·erdahl rpsponded t.hat he was 19. The respondent did not argue in 
the Washington eonrts or in his Brief in Opposition bere that this ad· 
mi ;:::; ion eliminated the need for 01·ercJab[ to prod\H'C idl'ntific;dion am! 
thus im·alidates the Yi ~it to the room. 
'• 
the table and examined the sec·ds and the pipe more dosely. 
The pipe smrllt•d of marihuana. 
The officer inforwed both students of their rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966), and each indicated 
he was willing to waive those rights. The officer then :u:ked 
wlwther they had any other drugs. The respondent handed 
him three small plastic bags containing marihuana. At 1l1at 
point, the officer called by r&diu for n~:-isbnee. On('C a sec-
ond officer had arrived. the students were tDld a thorough 
~r~,!dl of the room '\oulcl be nece~·~:~ry. The offic·\'rs PX-
plnilH:tl t.u tl1e two students that they had an :::Lsolute right 
to insist. that the officers nrst obtain a warrant but t.hat tl1cy 
could eunse11t to the search . The officers also informed them 
that ~wy consent ·would ha.ve to be voluntary an d they could 
refuse to consent. The respondent and Overdahl conferred 
in whic:pers. then announced that they would consent. The 
:o;earch yielded more marihuana and a quantity of lysergic 
acid diethylamide (LSD). 
An information charged the respondent with one count of 
possessing more than 40 grams of marihuana and one of pos-
sessing LSD, both felonies under Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 
(c) (current version at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d)). 8 
A pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room 
was denied. The respondent was convicted after a bench 
trial. On appeal. the \ ·rashington Court of Appeals upheld 
the search and affirmed. 24 Wash. App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316 
(1979). 
The Supreme Court of Washii1gton reversed. 94 Wash. 2d 
711 , 619 P. 2d 971 (1980). It held that. although the officer 
properly had placed Overdahl under arrest and followed him 
to the dormitory room, he had no right to enter the room. 
There was no indication that Overdahl might seize a weapon 
or destroy evidence (the gin bottle). and. with the officer 
blocking the only exit from the room, there \\·as no possibility 
~ Overda hl was trit>d with the respondent for poss\•s::;ing marihuana and 
also was tonvieted. The charges against- him wen' dismissed while tht>-
case was pend ing before the Supreme Court. of ·washington. 
' . 
3 
o:l escape. Because no exigen t circumstance required the 
officer to enter the room alld thus view its interior. hi s seizure 
of the sepds and the pipe did not fall within the ''plain view" 
exc:eption to the warrant requirement; that exception re-
quires some prior justification for the officer's bring where he 
sePs the contraband. In addition . because the rrsponclent 
an J On:rduhl's consent to the subsequent sC'arch of room \\US 
the fruit uf the •·ffiC'fr's initi<Jl Pntry, tlH' C'CJtdr::Jhttd found 
duriJJg that ~ -.. reh should have }J( en suppn··.-.C'd a.c: \\·dl.4 
Three .Tustiees dis::-eiH<'d. They belien'd it \l'clS full)· rc:l-
H•nJble for a police offr·er to krep On·r·l .. lJ]_ ::111 :trrt·,l<'l', in 
sight at all times. incJuding while he entered the room. The 
offieer therefore had a lL~gitima te rcusl1n, in the vi<.·"· of the 
disEC'nters. for being in the place where hr dis(~overPd ('OJJtra-
bl:llid in "plain view." 
v·ie be l iev e th e Supreme Cou r t of 
Washington erred i n holding tha t the 
o ff icer h aH no r ight t o s t a nd in t he 
doo rway. That c ourt conclude d that the 
o f fic e r, having lawfully placed Overdahl 
u nder arrest, could follow him to his room. 
The Fourth Amendment does not deny a police 
officer who law fully has taken a per son 
into custody the authority to keep that 
individual in sight. The absence of an 
affirmative indication that a particular 
arrestee might reach for a weapon, destroy 
evidence, or escape does not vitiate that 
authority. See PennSf?lvania v. Mimms, 434 
U.S. 106,109-110 (197 ) ; United States v. 
Robin son, 414 U.S. 218, 234-236 (1974). 
Here, the officer d id not, upon his 
arrival, undertake a complete search of the 
4 Although Art. I, § 7 of ihe "ra:;hington Conf; titution provides that 
"[n]o per~mr f;hall be dist.urbP<l in his pri\·ate nffairs, or hi s homl' in-
Ynd<'d, without. authority of law," till' (·ourt nr\·Pr ('itt>d that provision. 
It did TPJWa tedly rPfer to tlw Fonrth Anl t>!ldmr nt. nnd ca,; t>.~ (·onstruing-
it ; therefore it. is d ear the court did not rest it s deei ~ion on <Ill independ-




room, including areas completely out of 
reach of the arrestee . Cf. Chimel v. 
California , 39 5 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
Rathe r, with appropriate restrain t, he 
remained at the c1oor, entering no farther 
than was necessa ry to kee the arreste d 
per son in v ie~v It \vas only by chance tha 
.. e offJcer, from this vantage point , 
observed on a table what he believed wa s 
con t band . 
Nothing i.n the Fourth Amendme 
!
prohibited the officer from being whe re he 
was when he made the critical observation 
in this case. Accord ingly, we grant the 
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Washington , and remand the case for further 
proceed i ng s not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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June 11, 1981 
Re: No. 80-1349, Washington v. Chrisman 
In response to the Chief Justice's circulation, I 
should say that the Chief Justice previously asked me 
whether I would be able to join his opinion if he made 
essentially the same changes he proposes in his circulation. 
I responded that the proposed changes did not overcome our 
differences in this case, and I countered by suggesting that 
the last two paragraphs of the opinion be modified to read 
as follows: 
"We believe the Supreme Court of Washington erred 
in holding the officer had no right to stand in the 
doorway. That court concluded that the officer had 
lawfully placed Over dahl under arrest and therefore 
was permitted to follow him to his room. The Fourth 
Amendment does not deny a police officer who lawfully 
has taken a person into custody the authority to keep 
"that individual in sight. The absence of an 
affirmative indication that a particular arrestee 
might reach for a weapon, destroy evidence, or attempt 
to escape does not vitiate that authority. See 
Penns y 1 van i a v • Mimms , 4 3 4 U . S • 1 0 6 , 1 0 9 -110 ( 19 7 7 ) ; 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-236 
(1973). Here, the officer did not, upon his arrival, 
undertake a complete search of the room, including 
areas completely out of reach of the arrestee. Cf. 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 742, 763 (1969). 
Rather, with what seems to us appropriate restraint, 
he stood in the doorway, proceeding no farther than 
was necessary to keep the arrested person in view. It 
was only by chance that, from this vantage point, the 
officer observed on a table what he believed was 
contraband. 
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits the 
officer from being where he was when he made this 
observation. If the officer was 'in' the room we are 
quite sure he was legally there; and if from that 
vantage point he reasonably believed that what he saw 
on the table was contraband, he could seize that 
material without a warrant. Our 'plain view' cases fJ 111 ,.r $ · · te as much. On the other lu1nd, if, he was not r. W 
--7 ~e room, th,g_ .E_],_a~_v1 ew doc trii?e wou!d "" not ~ _ 
1 el just'ify his entr ""'T nto t ne room even i f Pi e had /--..~ 
pro a5 e cause to be 1eve a w e saw was ~,_,;;,v 
c~ warrantless entry would be proper only 
if there were exigent circumstances, which may or may 
not have been present in this case. Accordingly, we 
grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington and remand 
the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion." 
As I understand it, the Chief Justice found my 
suggested revision unacceptable because it recognizes that 
although an officer's lawful observations from outside a 
dwelling may give him probable cause to believe that there 
is incriminating evidence inside the dwelling, the plain 
view doctrine alone does not justify a warrantless entry to 
seize that evidence. I would rather grant the petition for 
a writ of certiorari and hear the case than join the ~ 
curiam with the Chief Justice's suggested revision. I 
believe the Washington Supreme Court would interpret the 
Chief Justice's opinion as strongly suggesting that whether 
or not the officer had "entered" the room by standing in the 
doorway, the plain view doctrine alone permitted him to 








June 16, 1981 
.t 
PE: No. 80-1349, ~~~hington v. Chrisman 
I still would like to correc t the primary defec t of 
t he washington Supreme Court's decision--i.e., its 
holding that a polic e office r may not keep an arrestee 
i n sight--\dthout using the '' poor" facts of th is case for 
resolving , one way or another , whether a warran t i s 
r equired t o enter a dwelling when con t raband i s se en in 
"plain v i e w" from the outside. Therefore, I ....a.m.Jl-i.lli:_ng 
to add a footnote expressly saying that other elements 
of t he "pla in v i ew" doctrine remain unresolved in this 
case. I am not willing, however, to go along with 
Byron's proposed final paragraph, which, as I read it, 
would decide that a warrant ordinarily is needed under I 
such circumstances. I continue to disagree with that r 
position, and Potter, Harry, Lewis, and Bill Rehnquist 
seemed to share my view. 
I do not know how the Washington Supreme Court will 
resolve this question, if Chrisman raises it. I still 
am convinced that (a) we need not reach this issue in 
this case and (b) we would be better off addressing it 
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U.r . Justice Rphnqu1st 
Pro~: ~ne Chief Just1oe 
Circulat ed: ______ _ 
JUNE 16, 1981 
REVISED PROPOSED DR.\FT Re r-1 rcuht•H~: ________ _ 
c- 'Uc --.-'. ~ .,.-;>. ('f t -,- F}"T\ (i......,!' ~. 1:77· -~ -~- ~- ~~ --:-1! i,;',D S'71l A rJ"if.~ u' l J\L' .... . tt~~ _\! _ _<1t .l __ , .~··L L . ___ 1 rt .. D•J 
P··H C'FHI:\.l\1, 
A ('[:.Inj)US police officer at \Ya.shington State rniversity 
oLsc:rwd a male you th, Carl 0\·ercbhl, exit a studc,nt dormi-
tory c.:Jrrying a half-ga1Jon bottle of gin. Because Washing-
ton b\\. forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by persons · 
under 21, ·wash. Rev. Code § 06.44.270/ and Overdahl ap-
peared to be under age, the officer stopped him and asked for 
inentificat ion. Overdahl replied that he would have to re-
turn to his room to obtain id entification. The officer accom-
panied him.= 
The room was approxim ately 11 by 17 feet and located on 
the 11th floor of the dormitory. The respondent, Overdahl's 
roommate, was in the roon1 when the officer and Overdahl 
arrived. The officer remained in the doorway when Overdahl 
went inside. The respondent became visibly nervous at the 
sight of the officer. 
\Vhile waiting, the officer observed seeds and a small pipe 
lying on a table in the room. From his training and experi-
ence, he be1ieved the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was 
of a type used to smoke marihuana. He then went over to 
1 VniveJ:"ity rcgubt .ion~ also forb :l<l(' po;;~e~s ion of :-~ l coholic brn•r3ges 
on university prOJll'r1)'. Tr. 4, 34. 
2 ·while w:1iting for the c-lt•vator, thl' officer ;,~krd On•rd.1hl hi~ :-~gc. 
On:rd:Jhl rrspondrd that hE' W:J::' 10. The rrsjlondl'n t clid not :trgup in 
the IY:1o:hington cour1s or in his Brief in Oppo~ition here 1l1llt this ad-
mi:, !on e:~:1;1ill:l1rd tk· m·r.d for OnJCl::hl to jJrodmc icl l'ntiflcttion and 




• > • 
') 
tLe bble and rxamined the S('<·ds 3lld the pipe more· <-l usdy. 
The pipe smP.ll(·d of maril1uana. 
The officer informed both stutlcnts of their rigl1ts unrler 
l\firanda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1066), and ench indicated 
11e was willing to waive those rights. The officer then a~ked 
wlH:iher tl1ey had any other drugs. The respondent l1nmled 
Lim three small pbstic bags containing m::.rihuana. At tlwt 
l'·:•i,Jt. the officer called by radio fur :1!"~;~:,,,Jc· e. 0JJ<'r' :l '-'CC' -
c••ld officer had arriYed, the students were toJd a thorough 
~- ~rc-h of the room \\·ould Le JH·c·<·".;ar:r. The t•ffic-crs <'X-
p1:::.:;:cd to the two st cclcnts that tll\:'Y ll;;rl 3ll :;:.J::·o]:;1" righ t 
to insist that the offi<:ers first oht ai n a w:1Irflllt but tiwi 1l1ey 
could consent t.o the search . The offic-ers :1lso infwJJwd tl1em 
that any r·onsent would ha\'e to be Ynlu nt<>ry !'lnd they euuld 
zefuse to consent. The rrspondent ilnd Owrdahl c-onf( rred 
in whispers, then amJOU JJced that they would con~ent. ThP 
~carch yielded more marihuana and a quantity of }y;:-l rgic 
acid didhybmide (LSD). 
An information c:J1arged the respondent ·with one count of 
posse~sing more than 40 grams of marihuana and one of pos-
sessing LSD, both felonies UJlder ·wash. Rev. Code§ 69.50.401 
(c) (current version at ·wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d)).1 
A pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room 
was denied. The respondent was convicted after a bench 
trial. On appeal. the lrashington Court of Appeals upheld 
the search and affirmed. 24 W"ash. App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316 
(1979) . 
The Supreme Court of \Yashii1gton reversed. 94 Wash. 2d 
711, 619 P. 2d 971 (1980). It held that. although the officer 
properly ha.d placed Overdahl under arrest and followed him 
to the dormitory room, he had no right t..o enter the room. 
There was no indication that Overdahl might seize a weapon 
or destroy evidence (the gin bottle). and. with the officer 
blocking the only exit from the room, there was no possibility 
~ On.-~ rda hl was trifd with the respondPnt. for po~Sl-'&iing marihuana and 
olso was convicted. Thr charges :Jgainst him were dismis.~ed while th{'-
case was pending before the Suprrme Court. of Vi'a1'hington . 
:, 
- .. . 1 r_...... . .I"' 
. .. 
3 
ol es(·a pe. Bl'cause no £'). igtn t tilt UlJt."-\:lltce n·q!Ji r l"f l tllC 
officer to enter the room and thus Yicw its interior, his ~r i zure 
of tlH-' seeds and the pipe did not fall within the "pl nin , ·iew" 
exc:eption to the warrant requirement; tha t exc('ption re-
quires some prior justifica tion for thP of!icrr 's LeiJJg ,,·here he 
sees t.he con t raband. Jn addi t ion. b N:ause the rcS]!\;llclent 
nn d 0 Yerdahl's consent tD the suh:::r·qu{'nt se:1rch of room was 
;),(' f; ~:t Of n1c (>fficcr's in iti3.J f'Jilfy, J1i(· ('I>Jl ~ J {J l t;:Jl d J(Jl)il(.l 
nuring tha t s~ ~Heh shou ld haYe Lc(•Ji s:J}•J •J (•::-\.d [i.~ \'.tll .< 
Th rre Jusi iccs di~senkd. Tl1t·~· J \ }i( 'hi it wf'! .c:: fu1ly JT3 -
s ... JJ~b1e for a police ollir·c-r to h·l'J' On•d:,hl. 211 ::n ,·~ t•·t· . iL 
sigll t. at all tiJnes . ineludill g while he C'JJtued thf lllOill. Tl1E· 
uf!Jeer therefore h ad a Jc·gitima'Le r~~SClll. in tJJ(' \ie\\· of tJ1~· 
dissentPrs. for being in the pl aee ' ' lHn· ht: di:::covFrl'd Cvllt: n-
halld in uplain view." 
I In our view , the Supreme Cour t of 
Washi ng ton e r r ed in holding tha t the 
o f f icer had no right t o stand in t he 
d oorway. That court conc l uded that the 
o f f icer, having lawfully p l aced Overdahl 
u nder arrest, could follow him to his room. 
!The Fourth Amendment permits a police 
officer who lawfully has taken a per son 
f i nto custody to keep that individual in 
sight. The absence of an affirmative 
i ndication that the arreste e might reach 
l f or a we apon, destroy evidence, or flee 
does not vitiate that authority. See 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-
110 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414 
u.s. 218, 234-236 (1974). Here, the 
officer did not, upon his arrival, under-
4 AJthougb Art.. I, § 7 of ihe W11shington Constitution provides that 
"[n]o person shall be disturbro in his private affairs, or l1is home in-
Y:J ded, \lit.hout. authority of lnw," the c·ourt. nrve r C'itrci that provision. 
lt rud rppt>a tedly refer to the Fonrth Amendment. :md ca.,;es <"Onstrui nlf' 
it; t herefore it. is tl ear the court did not rest its det:i~ i on on an independ-
ent state ground . 
-
take a complete search of the room, 
including areas completely out of reach of 
the arrestee. Cf. Chimel v. California, 
3 9 5 U. S • 7 5 2 , 7 6 3 ( 19 6 9 ) . Ra the r , with 
appropriate restraint, he remained at the 
I open doorway, entering no farther than was 
necessary to keep the arrested person in 
view. It was only by chance that the 
!officer from this vantage point--where he was lawfully present--observed on a table 
\vhat he believed vms contraband. 
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment 
prohibited the officer from being where he 
was when he made the critical observation 
in thjs case. Accordingly, we grant the 
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Washington, and remand the case for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 5 
It is so ordered. 
S.Secause the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that the officer had no 
right to keep Overdahl in sight, it did not 
examine any other requirements for a lawful 
seizure under these circumstances. These 
issues are for the state courts to resolve 
in the first instance. 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No.S0-1349 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell October 26, 1981 
From: David Levi 
No. 80-1349: State of Washington v. Chrisman 
Question Presented 
Whether an Officer who is standing in the doorway of 
an arrestee's room may enter the premises when he observes 
contraband lying in plain view and when he is keeping the 
arrestee in sight? 
Introduction 
2. 
The Court granted this petition after it was unable 
to agree 
prepared 
on a summary 
by the Chief. 
reversal. You 
Justice White 
joined a percuriam 
first circulated a 
dissent then a concurrence. Ultimately Justices Stevens, 
Brennan, White, and Marshall voted to grant and set for 
argument. The case has already received far more analysis and 
attention from the Court than I fear it deserves. 
I. Facts and Decision Below 
A. Facts 
On the evening of January 21, 1978, a campus police 
Officer saw defendant Overdahl walk out of a dormitory at 
Washington State University carrying a half-gallon bottle of 
gin. Because state law forbids possession of alcohol by a 
minor, and because Overdahl appeared to be under 21, the 
Officer stopped him and asked for identification. Over dahl 
replied that he would have to go upstairs to his room to get 
the identification. The Officer stated that he would have to 
accompany him to the room. 
Upon arriving at the 11th floor of the dorm, the 
Officer followed Overdahl down the hallway to his room. 
Overdahl pushed open the slightly ajar door and entered the 
room while the Officer remained in the doorway . 
. •' 
3. 
Overdahl'~ommate, Neil Chrisman, respondent here, was in the 
room and became visibly nervous at the sight of the Officer. 
After watching the two students for a few minutes, 
the Officer observed seeds and a small pipe lying on a desk. 
Suspecting that the seeds were marijuana and the pipe of the 
type used to smoke marijuana, the Officer walked to the table 
to investigate more closely. The pipe smelled of marijuana. 
From this point on, the facts are not essential. 
Briefly, the Officer read the two roommates their rights, 
received their permission to search the room, and discovered 
more marijuana and a quantity of LSD. The trial court denied 
a motion to suppress this evidence, and Chrisman was convicted 
on a two count indictment. The court of appeals upheld the 
search and affirmed. 
B. Decision By the Supreme Court of Washington 
The supreme court of washington reversed. The court 
found that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement 
would not justify the seizure of the pipe and seeds in this 
I( \\ 
case. The plain view exception is available in two sorts of 
situations: ~ it permits the warrantless seizure of 
incriminating evidence discovered in a search of an area for 
other specified items pursuant to a valid warrant; ~ it 
permits the warrantless seizure of items discovered 
inadvertently after an intrusion otherwise excepted from the 
'r 
4 0 
warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971} 0 In either of the two situations, the Officer must 
have a prior justification for intrusion. 
The court found no justification for the Officer's 
intrusion into the room: 
The record i 6 in conflict as to whether [the offier] 
stood in the doorway and then entered the room or 
whether, while in the doorway, he was in fact in the 
room. We need not, however, let the result be 
determined by such niceties. The police Officer was 
in the room at the time he observed the seeds and 
pipe. The question is: Did he have a right to be 
there? 
Although Overdahl was placed under arrest outside of the dorm 
and continued to be under arrest when accompanied by the 
Officer to the room, the fact of arrest alone did not give the 
Officer the right to enter the room without a warrant. Nor 
------~------------~~-----------------------------
were there exigent circumstances requiring the Officer to 
enter the room: there was no evidence that the Officer was in 
any danger, that the bottle of gin was about to be destroyed, 
or that Overdahl was about to flee. Had the Officer not been 
"in" the room--i.e. in the doorway--he would not have seen the 
pipe and seeds, and the evidence must be suppressed. 
this extreme holding, the Officer should have remained outside 
the room with his back to the door. 
The three dissenters attacked the majority for 
failing to "explain convincingly •.. why the Officer was not 
' . 
5. 
entitled to keep the arrested person within his sight." It is 
well established that if a defendant is arrested at his - - -
dwelling and asks to go to another room the police may search ------ ! that room before or after granting the request. United States 
v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1975). If the 
Officer could have searched the room, he certainly had the 
right to enter it. Similarly, it is well established that if 
a defendant is arrested at his dwelling, and is permitted to 
go to another part of the dwelling for some purpose, the 
police may accompany him and any evidence inadvertently 
observed is admissible under the plain view doctrine. United 
States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094, 1101 (CA2 1977). 
In sum, the disagreement within the court below may 
be stated as follows: Absent exigent circumstances, does an 
Officer have the right to accompany a person who has just been 
arrested onto the arrestee's premises? 
II. Analysis 
A. The Colloquy Between the Chief and Justice White 
The Chief's first draft held that: 
the Fourth Amendment does not deny a police Officer 
who lawfully has taken a person into custody the 
authority to keep that individual in sight. The 
absence of an affirmative indiciation that a 
particular arrestee might reach for a weapon or 
attempt to escape does not vitiate that authority. 
~ 
See Pennsylvania v. Mims, 434 u.s. 106, 109-110 
{1977) The Officer did not undertake a complete 
search of the room Rather, with appropriate 
restraint, he remained at the door ... It was only be 
chance that the Officer observed on a table what he 
recognized at once to be contraband. This is a 
classic case of evidence found in plain view when a 
police Officerr, for unrelated and entirely 
legitimate reasons, obtains access to someone's 
privat area." 
6. 
Thus, the Chief proposed to adopt the position of the dissent 
below: An Officer may keep an arrestee in sight, and may 
enter the premises in order to do so. Justices Powell, 
Stewart, and Rehnquist joined. 
Justice White dissented. He argued that the Officer 
had a right to stand in the doorway and had a right to observe 
the seeds and pipe from that vantage. But having seen the 
drugs, the Officer did not have a right "to enter the 
dormitory room without a warrant to examine and seize those 
items." He characterized the Chief's per curiam as holding 
that a "warrantless entry and seizure was justified by the 
'plain view' doctrine." Justice White's concern was that the 
Court's holding would permit a police Officer who passes by 
the open door of a dwelling and witnesses contraband to enter 
the home and seize the evidence without a warrant. 
ll \\ 
points--! would say for two errors. unlike the court -
that the Officer "in" the room when 
drugs. Whereas the court below did not 
'• 
7. 
believe that the case should turn on such a "nicety," Justice 
White insists that indeed it should. e3>ustice White 
appears to mischaracterize the holding of the per curiam 
opinion. That opinion does not hold that the plain view 
doctrine justifies a warrantless entry; it holds that the 
Officer's need to maintain control of person who has been 
arrested justifies entry. 
In response to Justice White's dissent, the Chief 
added a footnote (footnote 5) to the effect that the Officer 
was "in the room" when he stood in the doorway and second that 
"exigent circumstnces" justified the seizure since had the 
Officer left to get a warrant, Chrisman might well have 
destroyed the evidence. 
After the Chief was unable to get a sixth vote, he 
re-wrote the per curiam in an effort to allay Justice White's 
fear that the plain view doctrine was being extended. In the 
revision, the Court holds only that the Officer had a right to 
keep a lawfully arrested person in sight regardless of whether 
exigent circumstances existed. Thus the Officer properly 
observed the pipe and seeds. Whether he then properly seized 
the pipe--because he was already "in the room" or because 
exigent circumstances existed--would be for the state courts 
to determine on remand. 
Justice White was not mollified. He had suggested 
the following language which the Chief had not been willing to 
include: 
... 
"If the Officer was "in" the room we are quite sure 
he was legally there; and if from that vantage 
point he reasonably believed that what he saqw on 
the table was contraband, he could seize that 
material without a warrant. On the other hand, if 
he was not "in" the room, the plain view doctrine 
would not itself justify his entry into the room 
even if he had probable cause to believe that what 
he saw was contraband. A warrantless entry would be 
proper only if there were exigent circumstances, 
which may or may not have been present in this 
case." 
a. 
The Chief would not include this paragraph becasue he did not 
wish to decide on the peculiar facts here whether the plain 
view doctrine would or would not authorize a warrantless entry 
when an Officer sees contraband inside a dwelling through an 
open door or window. 
Justic:_ w~~=-- di~ift ~s posl.:.!-on, however' J_o ~/( 4) 
the point of concurring in the judgment. In his concurrence 
.... ----
he argued that the Officer was properly in the doorway and had 
properly observed the pipe and seeds. But he argued the 
Officer had not entered the room by simply standing in the 
doorway and his warrantless entry into the room could not be 
justified by the plain view doctrine. The only justification 
would be if the Officer had probable cause to believe that the 
items were contraband and if exigent circumstances justified 
an immediate seizure of the items. Justice White opposed the 
majority's holding that "as a matter of law ••• any police 
Officer who stands in the open doorway of a home has "entered" 
the home" because under such a rule the Officer might then 
'• 
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"intrude into a home without a warrant to seize any 
incriminating evidence or contraband that he is able to see 
while standing in the doorway." As the Court stated in 
Coolidge: "plain view alone is never enough to justify the 
warrantless seizure of evidence." Justice White would remand 
for a determination whether the __ exigent circumstances existed 
in this case. 
B. Resolving the Difference 
The Court is very close to an agreement on this 
case. Apparently all of the Justices agree that the Officer 
properly stood in the door and that he properly saw the seeds 
---~ ... -------------- -
and the pipe. 
~
Significantly, even Justice White would 
apparently agree that had it been necessary for the Officer to 
take a couple of steps into the room in order to maintain 
Overdahl within sight, the Officer could have then picked up 
the items under the plain view doctrine. 
The Court may not be in agreement as to whether the 
plain view doctrine itself permits a warrantless entry as, for 
example, when an Officer sees contraband inside of a dwelling 
through an open door. At the least, the Chief is reluctant to 
decide this question on these facts and in the setting of a 
college dormitory. And the Court is not in agremement as to 
whether an Officer is "in" the room when he stands in the 
doorway. Justice White fears that under such a view a 
10. 
policeman who sells raffle tackets from the doorway will then 
be able to march into the residence if he sees contraband from 
the doorway without first obtaining a warrant and without any 
exigent circumstances. 
But I doubt that either of these two disagreements 
~significant in the context of the facts of tis case. Here 
the Officer was accompanying a person whom he had lawfully 
arrested. As the dissent below argued, had the Officer 
arrested Overdahl in his home and had Overdahl asked to go to 
another room in the house, the Officer could have accompanied - _ __,__....,_.... 
him, could have seized anything in plain view, and could have 
,........., - - -----
searched the room both before and after the defendant was 
-----------~------------~----------permitted to go into it. For his safety, the Officer must be 
able to maintain an arrestee in sight and must be able to 
control the area around the arrestee. The officer in this 
case apparently believed that he could best maintain control 
of the room and its two occupants by standing in the doorway. 
In this setting, I think that the officer is "in" the room--
whether he is in the doorway or two steps into the room--and 
anything the officer sees is subject to the plain view 
exception. Certainly one's expectation of privacy in a room 
is considerably lessened following an arrest and after an 
officer has taken up a position from which he may view the 
arrestee's every move and from which he may intervene if need 
be. 
This does not mean that an officer who sees 
contraband through an open doorway or who stands in the 
doorway of a house would be given the same leeway to enter the 
dwelling and seize items in plain view. I think one can make 
a strong argument that an officer who sees contraband--as 
opposed to incriminating evidence--is seeing the perpetration 
of a crime and may enter a dwelling to seize the contraband. 
But the Court does not need to decide that question on this 
case. 
To accept Justice White's approach would involve the 
Court in making the sort of artificial distinctions so common 
already to the fourth amendment. Thus if the officer had 
taken one step forward when accompanying Overdahl, Justice 
White would decide the case differently. Had the officer 
needed to peer around a corner and so had come forward into 
the room, or had the table been by the door, the case might be 
different. In this way the architecture of the room and the 
placement of the furniture would determine application of the 
fourth amendment. 
One could argue in response that when an officer 
steps into a room for the purpose of examining what he 
suspects are drugs the matter should be treated differently 
than when the officer steps in to maintain control of the 
arrestee and then sees the drugs. But there are at least 
three problems with adopting such a rule. First, the rule 
won't be of any effect in reality: the officer will simply 
J 
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testify that he came into the room to keep any eye on the 
arrestee. Second, such a rule "penalizes" officers who show 
restraint and do not come barging into the room. In the 
future officers will simply act in a more intrusive fashion to 
begin with. And finally, the distinction hinges on the fact 
that the officer was standing at the entrance of the room 
rather than just inside the threshhold when he saw the 
suspicious items. That the case should turn on this 
difference seems to make little sense. If the Officer was 
content to stand at the doorway it was because he could 
maintain control from that vantage and could see the 
arrestee's every move. In these circumstances the officer is 
every bit as much "in" the room as if he had taken a couple of 
steps forward. In either case the intrusion has occurred, and 
has occurred lawfully, while the expectation of privacy has 
been destroyed. 
I'- "" ; '- ,, 
In sum, it is the factor of a lawful arrest that so . -distinguishes this case. By holding that an officer who has 
-----------------------placed a person under arrest may accompany that person into 
his dwelling and into any room in to which he goes, and by 
holding that the officer may then seize anything in plain 
view, I do not think that the Court is creating an exception 
to the warrant requirement that should trouble Justice White. 
Such a holding comports with commonsense and the purposes of 
the plain view exception, and does not decide the case in 
which an officer sees contraband through an open door but 
' . 
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where no arrest has been made. That question can wait for a 
less idiosyncratic set of facts. 
Of course the Court could hold simply that the 
officer could stand at the doorway and look into the room. 
That was the Chief's approach in his second effort and such a 
holding is enough to vacate and remand. It would then be left 
to the state courts on remand to decide if there were exigent 
circumstances justifying the seizure of the items or whether 
the fact that the officer was maintaining watch over an 
arrestee permitted him to enter the room without a warrant and 
regardless of whether exigent circumstances existed. 
III. Arguments of the Parties 
A. Chrisman 
Chrisman makes many of the arguments Justice White 
has made. In addition, he suggests that the decision below 
can be understood to rely on the state constitution and 
therefore rests upon an independent and adequate state ground. 
But Chrisman has no evidence of such a basis except for a few 
citations in the opinion to state cases. By contrast, the 
opinion relies heavily upon decisions of this Court and 
nowhere indicates that its holding is one of state law. 
Chrisman also argues that the officer had no right 
to ask Overdahl for identification without first advising him 
of his rights. The act of giving the identification to the 
14. 
officer would have been a testimonial act relevant to the 
offense of possession of alcohol by a minor. But this 
argument does not appear to have been raised below; if the 
argument has any validity, and if Chrisman has standing to 
make it, it can be offered on remand. 
Finally, Chrisman argues that there were no exigent 
circumstances requiring the officer to act immediately without 
a warrant. The room was under control; the officer was in 
communication via walkie-talkie with other officers who could 
have aided him in maintaining the status quo while a warrant 
was obtained. 
B. The State 
In addition to arguing that the fact of an arrest 
permitted the officer to enter the room, the state argues that 
there were exigent circumstances requiring the officedr to 
enter the room and seize the contraband. The state agrees 
with Justice White that at the time the officer made his 
observation of the drugs, he was not "in" the room. But 
Overdahl had left the door open, giving the officer a view of 
the room and removing any expectation of privacy. The room 
was in "open view" and the officer was entitled to look in. 
Seeing the drugs, and in view of Chrisman's nervousness and 
the likelihood that the contraband would be detroyed, the 
officer properly entered the room under the exigent 
circumstances exception. The officer could not have left to 
obtain a warrant in these circumstances. Moreover, the 
• J 
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suggestion that the officer should have called for help and 
maintained control of the premises pending a warrant would 
itself have required a continuing invasion of privacy that 
could only be justified by exigent circumstances. The officer 
would have had to require that the door remain open and the 
occupants remain under his direct control. This is no triumph 
intrusive method of for the fourth amendment; the least 
protecting the evidence was for the officer to seize it 
immediately. 
It may well be that on a remand the state could 
successfully show that there were exigent circumstances 
justifying the seizure. The intermediate appellate court so 
held, although the state supreme court did not reach the 
question since it found that the officer should not have been 
at the doorway looking into the room in the first place. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Court may vacate and remand this case on either 
of two grounds: 
1. The Court may hold that an officer may accompany 
an arrested person to his dwelling and keep the arrestee 
within sight. This was the Chief's approach in his second per 
curiam. On remand the lower court must decide whether exigent 
circumstances justified the officer's entry into the room and 
16. 
seizure of the i terns or whether the fact that Overdahl was 
under arrest justified the officer's entry into the room. 
2. The Court may hold that when an officer 
accompanies an arrested person to his dwelling, and takes up a 
position from which he can watch the arrestee and maintain 
control of the situation, he may seize any contraband items 
that he can see from his vantage point. This was the Chief's 
approach in his first opinion. 
I think either approach would be proper. The first 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1349 
WASHINGTON, PETITIONER v. 
NEIL MARTIN CHRISMAN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[November-, 1981] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to consider whether a police officer 
may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, accompany an 
arrested person into his residence and seize contraband 
discovered there in plain view. 
I 
On the evening of January 21, 1978, Officer Daugherty of 
the Washington State University police department ob-
served Carl Overdahl, a student at the University, leave a 
student dormitory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Be-
cause Washington law forbids possession of alcoholic bever-
ages by persons under 21, Wash. Rev. Code §66.44.270, and 
Overdahl appeared to be under age, 1 the officer stopped him 
and asked for identification. Overdahl said that his identifi-
cation was in his dormitory room and asked if the officer 
would wait while he went to retrieve it. The officer an-
swered that under the circumstances he would have to ac-
'In addition, University regulations prohibit possession of alcoholic bev-
erages on University property. Tr. 4, 34. At the suppression hearing, 
Officer Daugherty testified that, because of these regulations, he would 
have stopped Overdahl without regard to his age. Tr. 10. 
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company Overdahl, to which Overdahl replied "O.K." 
Overdahl's room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and lo-
cated on the 11th floor of the dormitory. Respondent Chris-
man, Overdahl's roommate, was in the room when the officer 
and Overdahl entered. The officer remained in the open 
doorway, leaning against the doorjamb while watching Chris-
man and Overdahl. He observed that Chrisman, who was in 
the process of placing a small box in the room's medicine cabi-
net, became nervous at the sight of an officer. 
Within 30 to 45 seconds after Overdahl entered the room, 
the officer noticed seeds and a small pipe lying on a desk 8 to 
10 feet from where he was standing. From his training and 
experience, the officer believed the seeds were marijuana 
and the pipe was of a type used to smoke marijuana. He en-
tered the room and examined the pipe and seeds, confirming 
that the seeds were marijuana and observing that the pipe 
smelled of marijuana. 
The officer informed Overdahl and Chrisman of their rights 
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966); each ac-
knowledged that he understood his rights and indicated that 
he was willing to waive them. Officer Daugherty then asked 
whether the students had any other drugs in the room. The 
respondent handed Daugherty the box he had been carrying 
earlier, which contained three small plastic bags filled with 
marijuana and $112 in cash. At that point, Officer Daugh-
erty called by radio for a second officer; on his arrival, the 
two students were told that a search of the room would be 
necessary. The officers explained to Overdahl and Chris-
man that they had an absolute right to insist that the officers 
first obtain a search warrant, but that they could voluntarily 
consent to the search. Following this explanation, which 
was given in considerable detail, the two students conferred 
in whispers for several minutes before announcing their con-
sent; they also signed written forms consenting to the search 
of the room. The search yielded more marijuana and a quan-
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Respondent was charged with one count of possessing 
more than 40 grams of marijuana and one of possessing LSD, 
both felonies under Wash. Rev. Code§ 69.50.401 (c) (current 
version at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d) (Supp. 1981)). A 
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room 
was denied; respondent was convicted of both counts. On 
appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
victions, upholding the validity of the search. 24 Wash. 
App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316 (1979). 
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. 94 Wash. 2d 
711, 619 P. 2d 971 (1980). It held that, although Overdahl 
had been placed under lawful arrest and "there was nothing 
to prevent Officer Daugherty from accompanying Overdahl 
to his room," the officer had no right to enter the room and 
either examine or seize contraband without a warrant. The 
court reasoned there was no indication that Overdahl might 
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence, and, with the officer 
blocking the only exit from the room, his presence inside the 
room was not necessary to prevent escape. Because the offi-
cer's entry into the room and his observations of its interior 
were not justified by "exigent circumstances," the seizure of 
the seeds and pipe were held not to fall within the plain view 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
The court went on to hold that because the students' consent 
to the subsequent search of the room was the fruit of the offi-
cer's initial entry, the contraband found during that search 
should also have been suppressed. 2 
Three Justices dissented. They concluded it was reason-
able for a police officer to keep an arrested person in sight at 
all times; accordingly, the officer had a legitimate reason for 
' Although Art. I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that 
"[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, 
without authority of law," the court never cited that provision. It did re-
peatedly refer to the Fourth Amendment and cases construing it. While 
respondent urges that we "treat the case as having been decided under the 
Washington Constitution," it is clear that the court did not rest its decision 
on an independent state ground. 
,.. 
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being in the place where he discovered the contraband, and 
was entitled, under the plain view doctrine, to seize it. 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1981), and reverse. 
II 
A 
The "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize 
what clearly is evidence or contraband when it is discovered 
in a place where the officer has a right to be. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United 
States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968). Here, the officer had placed 
Overdahl under lawful arrest, and was therefore authorized 
to accompany him to his room for the purpose of obtaining 
identification. 3 The officer had a right to remain literally at 
Overdahl's elbow at all times; nothing in the Fourth Amend-
ment is to the contrary. 
The central premise of the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Washington is that Officer Daugherty was not entitled to ac-
3 The trial court found that it was Overdahl who proposed to retrieve 
the identification, and, after being informed that Officer Daugherty would 
have to accompany him, agreed to the officer's presence. Respondent 
nevertheless claims that Overdahl was "coerced" to return to the room in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment, because he was in custody and had not 
yet been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 
(1966). He argues that since identification would serve as proof of Over-
dahl's age-an element of the offense for which he had been arrested-the 
officer could not ask him for this "incriminating" evidence without first ad-
vising him of his rights to counsel and to remain silent. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Overdahl's Fifth Amendment rights were vio-
lated in some fashion, this does not vitiate the legality of his arrest, nor 
does it undercut the officer's right to maintain custody over an arrested 
person. The failure to give "Miranda warnings" might preclude introduc-
tion of incriminating statements made by Overdahl while in custody; but no 
such statements are even peripherally involved in this case. The act of 
going to the room was neither "incriminating" nor a "testimonial communi-
cation." Cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 408-414 (1976). 
I I 
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company Overdahl from the public corridor of the dormitory 
into his room, absent a showing that such "intervention" was 
required by "exigent circumstances." We disagree with this 
novel reading of the Fourth Amendment. The absence of an 
affirmative indication that an arrested person might have a 
weapon available or might attempt to escape does not dimin-
ish the arresting officer's authority to maintain custody over 
the arrested person. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U. S. 106, 109-110 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414 
U. S. 218, 234-236 (1974). Nor is that authority altered by 
the nature of the offense for which the arrest was made. 
Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger 
to the arresting officer. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 
supra, at 234 n. 5. There is no way for an officer to predict 
reliably how a particular subject will react to arrest or the 
degree of the potential danger. Moreover, the possibility 
that an arrested person will attempt to escape if not properly 
supervised is obvious. Although the Supreme Court of 
Washington found little likelihood that Overdahl could escape 
from his dormitory room, an arresting officer's custodial au-
thority over an arrested person does not depend upon a re-
viewing court's after-the-fact assessment of the particular ar-
rest situation. Cf New York v. Belton, --U.S. --, 
-- (1981); United States v. Robinson, supra, at 235. 
We hold, therefore, that it is not "unreasonable" under the 
Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of rou-
tine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his 
judgment dictates, following the arrest. The officer's need 
to ensure his own safety-as well as the integrity of the ar-
rest-is compelling. Such surveillance is not an impermissi-
ble invasion of the privacy or personal liberty of an individual 
who has been arrested. 4 
• Indeed, were the rule otherwise, it is doubtful that an arrested person 
would ever be permitted to return to his residence, no matter how legiti-
mate the reason for doing so. Such a rule would impose far greater re-
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It follows that Officer Daugherty properly accompanied 
Overdahl into his room, and that his presence in the room 
was lawful. With restraint, the officer remained in the door-
way momentarily, entering no farther than was necessary to 
keep the arrested person in his view. It was only by chance 
that, while in the doorway, the officer observed in plain view 
what he recognized to be contraband. Had he exercised his 
undoubted right to remain at Overdahl's side, he might well 
have observed the contraband sooner. 
B 
Respondent nevertheless contends that the officer lacked 
authority to seize the contraband, even though in plain view, 
because he was "outside" the room at the time he made his 
observations. The Supreme Court of Washington noted that 
"[t]he record is in conflict as to whether Officer Daugherty 
stood in the doorway and then entered the room or whether, 
while in the doorway, he was in fact in the room." It con-
cluded, however, that it "need not ... let the result be deter-
mined by such niceties," and assumed for purposes of its deci-
sion that the officer "was in the room at the time he observed 
the seeds and pipe." We agree that on this record "such 
niceties" are not relevant. It is of no legal significance 
whether the officer was in the room, on the threshold, or in 
the hallway, since he had a right to be in any of these places 
as an incident of a valid arrest. 
Respondent's argument appears to be that, even if the offi-
cer could have stationed himself "inside" the room had he 
done so immediately upon Overdahl's entry, his 30- to 45-sec-
ond hesitation was fatal; and that having chosen to remain in 
the doorway, the officer was precluded from proceeding fur-
ther to seize the contraband. We reject this contention. 
Respondent's argument, if accepted, would have the per-
verse effect of penalizing the officer for exercising more re-
strictions on the personal liberty of arrested individuals than those occa-
sioned here. 
t 
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straint than was required under the circumstances. More-
over, it ignores the fundamental premise that the Fourth 
Amendment protects only against unreasonable intrusions 
into an individual's privacy. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 
u. s. 347 (1967). 
The "intrusion" in this case occurred when the officer, 
quite properly, followed Overdahl into a private area to a 
point from which he had unimpeded view of and access to the 
area's contents and its occupants. His right to custodial con-
trol did not evaporate with his choice to hesitate briefly in the 
doorway rather than at some other vantage point inside the 
room. It cannot be gainsaid that the officer would have had 
unrestricted access to the room at the first indication that he 
was in danger, or that evidence might be destroyed-or even 
upon reassessment of the wisdom of permitting a distance be-
tween himself and Overdahl. 
We therefore conclude that, regardless of where the officer 
was positioned with respect to the threshold, he did not aban-
don his right to be in the room whenever he considered it es-
sential. Accordingly, he had the right-and duty-to act as 
soon as he observed the seeds and pipe. 5 This is a classic 
instance of evidence found in plain view when a police officer, 
for unrelated but entirely legitimate reasons, obtains access 
to an individual's area of privacy. The Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit seizure of evidence of criminal conduct 
found in these circumstances. 6 
III 
6 The circumstances of this case distinguish it totally from one in which 
an officer, chancing by an open doorway to a residence, observes what he 
believes to be contraband inside. We therefore need not consider what, if 
any, added constraints are placed on an officer's ability to enter a residence 
to seize contraband in such a situation. 
6 In light of our disposition, we need not decide whether, as the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals held, the likelihood that the contraband would be 
destroyed constituted an "exigent circumstance" independently justifying 
the officer's entry into the room. 
• 
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Since the seizure of the marijuana and pipe was lawful, we 
have no difficulty concluding that this evidence and the con-
traband subsequently taken from respondent's room was 
properly admitted at his trial. Respondent voluntarily pro-
duced three bags of marijuana after being informed of his 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966). He 
then consented, in writing, to a search of the room, after be-
ing advised that his consent must be voluntary and that he 
had an absolute right to refuse consent and demand procure-
ment of a search warrant. The seizure of the drugs pursuant 
to respondent's valid consent did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 7 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is re-
versed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered . 
7 We reject as utterly frivolous the respondent's contention that, on the 
facts presented here, Officer Daugherty was required to knock and an-
nounce his presence at the doorway prior to entering the room. 
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page 7. Would you be willing to eliminate the second sentence 
of that footnote and insert in its place: "See, e.g. , Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-589 (1 980 ); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.s. 10, 14-15 (1948)." 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
1-.-
r •• 
~:.· .. ·. 





CHAMBE RS OF 
.JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~u:prtntt <!Jourlllf flrt ~b ~taie.9' 
~ag~ ~. Q}. ZO~J!$ 
December 23, 1981 
RE: No. 80-1349 Washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
.. ) ~ 
·......, ~ t7 
I i ,_.L...{/\...A-
Justice White 
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' I 
;§u:pumt C!Joud of tl{ t ~b' ~hrlta 
'Ulasqmgfon. ~. QJ. 2llc?.l!;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 28, 1981 
Re: 80-1349 - Washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
y; rlt I 
T.M. 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
J 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~u.pnmt <.qvnrt .of tlt.c ~:lttili~ $Statts 
~~slyhrgt.on. 1B· <!J. Zrlc?JI>;l 
v 
December 2 , 1981 
Re: No. 80-1349 - Washington v. Chrisman 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
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